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ABSTRACT 
 
Kristin Lowe Geonnotti: Prescription drug plan enrollment and patient outcomes in Medicare Part D 
beneficiaries with diabetes 
(Under the direction of Morris Weinberger) 
 
Medicare Part D aims to provide seniors with affordable prescription drug coverage. 
However, beneficiaries‟ out-of-pocket costs may vary widely between plans. For Part D to be most 
effective, beneficiaries should enroll into the prescription drug plan that minimizes total annual out-
of-pocket costs. However, several factors, including complex enrollment processes, may result in 
beneficiaries‟ failure to enroll into a “lowest-cost plan.” This study examines the prevalence and 
effect of being in a lowest-cost plan on patient outcomes, including: cost-related nonadherence 
(CRN); clinical outcomes; and health services use among Part D beneficiaries with diabetes. 
We identified patients with diabetes who were ≥ 65 years and received primary care from 
UNC‟s General Internal Medicine or Family Medicine practices. We combined data from telephone 
surveys, medical records, and publicly-available CMS cost data. Based on prescribed medications, we 
calculated: (1) total out-of-pocket medication costs and (2) out-of-pocket medication costs if they 
were enrolled in a lowest-cost plan. Differential costs are the difference between the total and lowest 
out-of-pocket costs. These calculations were made twice: once assuming that prescriptions were filled 
as written, and again with generic substitutions. Descriptive and multivariate regression analyses were 
used to examine all aims. 
75% of beneficiaries are not in lowest-cost plans. Differential costs are substantial: 50% of 
participants are in a plan that costs them at least $715 (“as written”) / $489 (“generic”) more than the 
lowest-cost plan, with a highest difference of over $7,500. On average, participants are paying 30% 
more than necessary to obtain medications. Additionally, a $1,000 increase in “as written” differential 
costs is associated with a 36% increase in the odds of experiencing CRN (p<0.05). In turn, CRN is 
associated with poorer outcomes including self-reported health status and increased inpatient stays.  
To my knowledge, this is the first prospective cohort study to link patients‟ plan, CRN and 
clinical parameters to evaluate Part D. By considering policies that increase the likelihood of 
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beneficiaries being enrolled in a lowest-cost plan, CMS has the potential to reduce CRN and improve 
patients‟ health outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1: SPECIFIC AIMS 
 
Medicare Part D, created under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, aims to reduce 
economic barriers that prevent beneficiaries from filling their prescriptions. Part D provides a federal 
prescription drug benefit, administered in the private market, for all Medicare beneficiaries. To 
maximize the effectiveness of Medicare Part D, beneficiaries should enroll into the prescription drug 
plan that best meets their needs; this can be defined as the plan that maximizes formulary coverage 
and minimizes annual out-of-pocket costs. Failure to enroll into a lowest-cost plan may leave 
beneficiaries vulnerable to cost-related nonadherence (CRN), which has been associated with worse 
clinical outcomes and increased health services utilization. Therefore, the inability to enroll in a 
lowest-cost plan may ultimately compromise the effectiveness of Part D. This study will examine the 
prevalence and effect of being in a lowest- cost plan on patient outcomes, including: CRN; clinical 
outcomes; and health services use among Part D beneficiaries with diabetes.  
In this study, patients’ medication-related costs is operationalized in three ways: (1) lowest-
cost plan enrollment, a dichotomous variable that indicates being in a plan with costs within 10% of 
the annual out-of-pocket costs in a lowest-cost plan; (2) total out-of-pocket-costs, a continuous 
variable that indicates the total annual medication expense in beneficiary’s current plan; (3) 
differential costs, a continuous variable calculated by subtracting lowest costs from total out-of-
pocket costs. 
 
Four specific aims are examined in this dissertation research: 
Primary Aims:  
(1) To describe the distributions of beneficiaries being in lowest-cost plans and differential costs; and 
whether dual eligible status affects the probability of being enrolled in a lowest-cost plan. 
Hypothesis: 
Dual eligibles will have a lower likelihood of being in lowest-cost plans than non-dual eligibles.   
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(2) To determine the association between lowest-cost plan enrollment/differential costs and CRN, as 
well as between CRN and clinical outcomes and health services utilization. 
Hypotheses: 
2a. Beneficiaries in lowest-cost plans will have a lower likelihood of experiencing CRN than 
those not in lowest-cost plans. 
2b. Beneficiaries with lower differential costs will have a lower likelihood of experiencing 
CRN than those with higher differential costs. 
2c. Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have worse clinical outcomes related to their 
diabetes than those who did not experience CRN. 
2d. Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have higher health services utilization than 
those who did not experience CRN.  
 
Secondary Aims: 
(3) To determine the association between total out-of-pocket costs and CRN, as well as between CRN 
and clinical outcomes and health services utilization. 
Hypotheses: 
3a. Beneficiaries with lower total out-of-pocket costs will have a lower likelihood of 
experiencing CRN than those with higher total out-of-pocket costs. 
3b. Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have worse clinical outcomes related to their 
diabetes than those who did not experience CRN. 
3c. Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have higher health services utilization than those 
who did not experience CRN.  
 
(4) To determine the association between switching plans and differential costs, plan satisfaction, and 
CRN. 
Hypotheses: 
4a. Beneficiaries who switched plans will have lower differential costs (and will have a 
higher likelihood of being in a lowest-cost plan) than those who did not switch plans. 
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4b. Beneficiaries who switched plans will have a higher likelihood of being satisfied with 
their current plan than those who did not switch plans. 
4c. Beneficiaries who switched plans will have a lower likelihood of experiencing CRN than 
those who did not switch plans. 
 
The study sample includes elderly Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes who receive primary 
care in the General Internal Medicine and Family Medicine practices at UNC. Data are collected from 
three sources: participant surveys, UNC medical records, and publicly-available CMS plan data. 
Eligible study participants completed a telephone survey about their Medicare Part D plan, CRN, and 
plan enrollment decisions. For each beneficiary, I used the CMS Prescription Drug Plan Finder tool to 
calculate total out-of-pocket costs and lowest costs. I calculated differential costs twice from these 
two numbers, once assuming that prescriptions were filled as written and again with generic 
substitutions. For patients who granted access to their medical record, the following data were 
abstracted: patient characteristics, diagnoses, prescribed medications, clinical outcomes (glycosylated 
hemoglobin, blood pressure, cholesterol), and health services utilization (inpatient stays and 
outpatient visits). 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview 
Prior to the enactment of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) in 2003, over 25% of 
Medicare beneficiaries were without drug coverage.
1, 2
 With its passage, Part D made prescription 
drug insurance available to all Medicare beneficiaries. This legislation, considered the largest 
expansion of Medicare since its inception,
3
 aims to improve access to, and affordability of, 
medications. Beginning in 2006, it is administered in the private market through stand-alone and 
Medicare Advantage prescription drug plans. For Part D to achieve its intended benefit, beneficiaries 
should enroll and remain in a plan that minimizes their annual out-of-pocket expense to obtain all 
prescribed medications. In so doing, individuals may be more likely to obtain their medications, 
thereby decreasing their cost-related non-adherence (CRN) and, in turn, improve clinical outcomes 
and decrease inappropriate health services use (Figure 1).
4-6
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed relationships under Part D 
 
 
 
Types of plans 
Private prescription drug plans (PDP) that offer Part D coverage contract with the Department 
of Health and Human Services to administer the Medicare Part D drug benefit. Drug benefits are 
offered in 34 geographic regions of the United States through stand-alone PDPs, Medicare Advantage 
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plans (MA-PDs), and Special Needs plans (SNPs). As compared to stand-alone PDPs, which only 
cover prescriptions and are meant to supplement those in traditional Medicare, MA-PDs offer both 
medical care and drug benefits under one plan (formerly called Medicare + Choice). SNPs are a type 
of MA-PD that target vulnerable subgroups, including the institutionalized, dual-eligibles, and 
beneficiaries with particular chronic conditions. SNPs aim to improve care for these groups through 
improved care coordination.
7
 While PDPs are offered at the state-level, MA-PD and SNP offerings 
vary by county. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) gives rebates to MA-PDs to 
encourage Medicare enrollees to move into managed care plans. MA-PDs are more likely to offer 
enhanced benefits such as vision coverage or fitness memberships. This may be due to rebates that are 
offered by CMS, which are intended to either supplement the benefits package or to offer lower 
premiums.
8
 However, these plans generally also have more limited provider networks.  
There are many sponsor organizations (insurance companies) from which individuals can 
choose or be assigned. Each sponsor organization can have up three plans in a given region. 
Nationally, there are 1,576 PDP options. In North Carolina in 2009, there were 49 PDPs offered by 21 
sponsor organizations. There are approximately the same number of MA-PD options, as well as 
approximately 10 additional SNP options, in each NC county. There are about 7% fewer PDP and 
10% fewer MA-PD offerings in 2010 as compared to 2009.
9
 Despite the large number of options, the 
market is fairly consolidated. In 2009, the top five insurance companies (UnitedHealth Group, 
Humana, Universal American Corp., Coventry Health Care, and Wellpoint) accounted for 55% of 
Part D enrollees.
10
  
 
Standard benefit 
CMS determines a standard benefit each year (Figure 2), but each sponsor organization can 
choose to offer a different plan as long as its coverage is at least actuarially equivalent. Only 10% of 
PDPs offered the standard benefit in 2009, down from 12% in 2008.
10, 11
 In 2009, the standard benefit 
started with a $295 deductible. After meeting the deductible, enrollees pay 25% cost-sharing for all 
drugs, with 75% paid by the plan until covered drug spending reaches $2,700. At that time, the 
enrollee hits the coverage gap, commonly referred to as the “doughnut hole.” While in the doughnut 
hole (spending between $2,700 and $4,350), the enrollee is responsible for 100% of drug costs. After 
reaching the $6,154 catastrophic threshold (spending $4,350 out-of-pocket), there is 5% cost-sharing 
on the part of the beneficiary, with the plan paying 15% and Medicare paying 80% (or $2.40 for 
generics; $6.00 for brands, whichever is higher). The $4,350 must be comprised of “true out-of-
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pocket spending,” in which off-formulary medications and cost-sharing by some sources of 
supplemental coverage (i.e. employer-sponsored policies) do not count.  
 
Figure 2: Standard benefit (2009) 
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All sponsor organizations must offer at least one standard benefit plan as described above. 
They can then offer up to two additional plans with enhanced benefits. These enhanced generally 
offer more comprehensive coverage, with the extra costs often being passed on to the beneficiary. 
Because the majority of sponsor organizations carry multiple plans, most offer at least one with 
enhanced benefits. For example, in NC in 2009 Humana offered: Humana Standard; Humana 
Enhanced; and Humana Complete. Humana Complete has a premium over three times higher than the 
other two, but is the only one of the three plans to offer coverage during the gap. The majority of PDP 
enrollees in 2007 (61%) enrolled into a standard benefit plan.
8
  
There has been an increase in plans that offer gap coverage for both PDPs (15% in 2006 and 
29% in 2008) and MA-PDs (28% in 2006 to 51% in 2008), although the type of coverage has 
changed. In 2008 no PDPs (and only 1% of MA-PDs) offered gap coverage of both generic and 
brand-name drugs.
13
 This can have cost implications for beneficiaries who rely on brand-name drugs 
and also have a gap in their coverage.
13
 Approximately 3.4 million beneficiaries (~13%) were 
anticipated to hit the coverage gap in 2007, most of whom would not get out of the doughnut hole 
before the end of the year.
10
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Enrollment 
Over 90% of all Medicare beneficiaries have obtained some form of prescription drug 
insurance: 26.7 million people are enrolled in Part D plans, while 14.1 million have an alternative 
other form of drug coverage.
10
 While MA-PDs are increasingly present, the majority of Part D 
beneficiaries are enrolled into PDPs: of the 26.7 million in Part D plans, about 66% are in PDPs and 
34% are in MA-PDs.
10
  
 
Figure 3: Part D enrollment (2009)
12
 
 
 
Adverse selection 
Differences have been observed as to the types of beneficiaries who are enrolled in PDPs 
versus MA-PDs. PDP enrollees tended to be older, poorer, sicker, and more rural than their MA-PD 
counterparts.
14
 In addition, early enrollees have higher utilization and out-of-pocket costs than those 
who enrolled into the benefit later and than those who chose not to enroll.
15
 Those with lower self-
reported health status also indicated significantly less intent to enroll.
16
 These enrollment patterns are 
somewhat expected and may reflect adverse selection because: (1) all duals, a group that is generally 
poorer and sicker, were auto-assigned to PDPs only (rather than to MA-PDs as well) and (2) MA-PDs 
aggressively market to healthier seniors. Moreover, similar adverse selection has been seen in elderly 
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non-Part D populations, where one study showed that having drug coverage is associated with a $308 
increase in drug expenditures.
17
 CMS tries to combat adverse selection in enrollment by enforcing a 
financial penalty on late enrollment. Those who are eligible but not enrolled will face a penalty equal 
to 1% of the national average premium for each uncovered month that they were eligible for Part D, 
but had no alternative creditable coverage. This penalty will be assessed each month, in addition to 
monthly premiums, beginning at the time that the beneficiary receives Part D benefits. 
 
Low-income subsidy 
CMS offers a LIS (also referred to as “extra help”) to beneficiaries who are below 150% of 
the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). This includes dual eligibles, individuals enrolled into the Medicare 
Savings Program (MSP), or individuals who receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI), as well as 
individuals not in these programs but who have annual incomes below 150% FPL ($12,150) and with 
assets less than $12,510 (2009).
10
 The criteria for being dually eligible vary by state. There are 
approximately 7.4 million dually-eligible Medicare beneficiaries nationally.
18
 The level of subsidy 
depends upon income, with full-duals paying $1.10-$2.40 for generics and $3.20-$6.00 for brand-
name drugs in 2009. Others pay more based upon a sliding scale, with a maximum of 15% co-
insurance. Plans that enroll LIS-individuals tend to have tighter formulary control as a means of 
controlling costs among a population that tends to use more medications. They cover an average of 
83% of drugs, as compared to 90% of drugs for non-qualifying plans.
9
 There is no coverage gap for 
all on-formulary medications except for the highest subsidy level. However, any off-formulary drugs 
cost full retail price. Dual eligibles automatically receive extra help; however, others must apply for 
the LIS benefit in order to receive it. 
 
Part D spending 
 
Costs to CMS 
CMS makes prospective payments to plans on behalf of beneficiaries; in contrast, reinsurance 
and LIS cost-sharing payments are retrospective. The prospective payments include a direct subsidy, 
in which plans are paid a monthly payment equal to a share of the national risk-adjusted average bid. 
The subsidy from CMS to plans averages 74.5% of basic coverage.
8
 In addition, there is a reinsurance 
mechanism whereby 80% of drug spending above the catastrophic limit is paid by CMS. Risk 
corridors, which have widened each year, also limit sponsor organizations‟ losses or profits.8  
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In 2005, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that Medicare Part D would cost $558 
billion between its implementation and 2013.
19
 According to CMS data, $47 billion was spent on Part 
D benefits and premiums in 2006. Of this, $44 billion was spent by Medicare, with the remaining $3 
billion spent out-of-pocket by beneficiaries.
8, 20
 In 2009, this spending increased to $53.4 billion.
9
 
These costs have been less than originally anticipated; however, the financial investment into Part D 
has been substantial.
8
 
 
Formulary 
CMS sets guidelines that all Part D plans must follow, including which drugs may be covered 
on plan formularies. For instance: 
- No over-the-counter drugs can be on a formulary; 
- Anything that Part B covers cannot be covered by Part D; 
- All drugs in six therapeutic classes must be covered; and 
- Generally, at least two drugs per therapeutic class must be covered unless only one is 
available.
9
  
Beyond these guidelines, insurance companies may design their formularies as they wish, 
which leads to substantial variation in formulary design. This formulary variation, rather than 
premium variation, is what mainly drives the wide range in out-of-pocket expense. Insurance 
companies use formulary design to balance access to medications with controlling growth in total 
spending.
9
 Most beneficiaries (80%) are in 3-tiered plans in which the first tier contains generics; the 
second tier contains preferred brand-name; and the third tier contains non-preferred brand-name 
drugs. An increasing number of formularies includes a separate specialty tier, on which biologics and 
other particularly expensive agents are placed. The 3-tier system effectively controls medication use 
and the associated costs.
21-24
 However, cost-sharing amounts and covered drugs can vary widely 
between plans: the number of drugs listed on-formulary varies between 37-100% of drugs reported to 
CMS.
9
  
Insurers also use coverage exemptions appeals and utilization management tools (prior 
authorization, quantity limits, step therapy requirements) to control access to certain medications. In 
practice, the use of such tools is infrequent: prior authorization was used on 8% of drugs; step therapy 
used for 1% of drugs; and quantity limits for 12%.
8
 In addition, medications that are not covered can 
still be obtained as if they were on formulary by going through an exemptions paperwork process, 
10 
 
which involves the physician. In practice, however, very few beneficiaries use the exemptions 
process, and over half of beneficiaries are not even aware of this option.
25
  
 
Medication use by, and costs to, beneficiaries 
Prior to the implementation of Part D, Pauly (2004) projected the impact of the policy on 
medication use and spending.
26
 In theory, Medicare coverage affects medication use via out-of-pocket 
costs to the beneficiary. Those without drug coverage would significantly increase use, but those 
already having drug coverage (~75% of the population) would not significantly alter their prescription 
drug spending. Some of the increase would result from overuse due to moral hazard, rather than in 
improvement in underuse due to new insurance coverage. Therefore, according to this study, Part D 
would reduce overall user cost by 14% and increase medication use by 6%.
26
 
Empirically-based studies have found that Part D increases average medication use by 6-13%, 
while decreasing average out-of-pocket costs by 13-18%; the absolute dollar savings are small and 
depend upon previous coverage and time of enrollment.
15, 27-30
 In a pre-post-2006 study, Lichtenberg 
and Sun (2007) compared retail pharmacy claims data for elderly (>65) and non-elderly to compare 
Medicare enrollees and non-enrollees. They found that drug utilization, operationalized as mean 
number of days of therapy, increased by 12.7%, while the mean amount paid decreased by 18.4%. 
This accounts for an overall decrease of 6% in amount paid by beneficiaries, which is similar to the 
above theoretical estimate. In contrast, third parties experience a 22.3% increase in amount paid.
27
 
Similarly, Yin, et al. (2008) estimate that after Part D enrollment was stable (from May 2006 
forward), medication utilization increased by 5.9%, but out-of-pocket costs decreased by 13.1% 
($5.20).
15
 It was not possible to link this drug utilization to health outcomes because the study was 
based on pharmacy claims data. A recent study by Zhang, et al. (2009) found that among Medicare 
Advantage enrollees, Part D reduced out-of-pocket spending by 13.4% for those without prior 
coverage, and by 15.9% for those with prior coverage that had a cap.
30
 Results from this study also 
show that the actual dollar amounts attached to these percentages are small (<$50).
31
 However, this 
estimate is only indicative of savings from enrolling into any Part D plan, rather than into a lowest-
cost plan. Therefore the savings may be even greater if the enrollee is in a lowest-cost plan. 
Cost sharing varies by beneficiary characteristics. Medication spending by beneficiaries who 
previously lacked insurance for medications increased 74% after Part D implementation. The 
increases were less for those with previous coverage.
31
 Sicker beneficiaries have higher medication 
expenditures than healthier beneficiaries.
15, 32
 For those with diabetes and no previous coverage, there 
was a 44% increase in the number of prescriptions filled for diabetic and lipid-lowering mediations.
31
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As expected, cost-savings were greatest for poor beneficiaries, as out-of-pocket spending declined 
most significantly for duals and LIS-eligibles, but less so for the general Part D population.
29
 Other 
analyses suggest that duals were not adversely impacted for drug utilization or out-of-pocket expense 
when making the transition from Medicaid to Part D: their drug utilization remained constant and 
they did not have different out-of-pocket expense relative to a control group.
33, 34
  
Enrollees pay highly variable prices across plans. PDP copays can range from $0 to $25 for 
generics; $15 to $59 for preferred brand name drugs; and $35 to $93 for non-preferred brand name 
drugs.
8
 26% of all Part D beneficiaries spent more than $100/month on prescriptions, and 8% spent 
over $300/month (significantly less for duals).
14, 35
 On average, cost-sharing for all beneficiaries has 
increased over time, in part because premiums were comparatively low in 2006 in order to attract 
enrollees.
36
 While many plans increased premiums, plans with the largest proportion of market share 
disproportionately increased their premiums relative to other plans in the market.
8
 From 2007-2008, 
the average premium for the top three plans rose 27%.
36
 Humana‟s average premium was $9.51 
(2006); $15.14 (2007); and $25.82 (2008). UnitedHealth‟s basic plan premium was $25.18 (2006); 
$29.57 (2007); and $40.36 (2008).
36
 This represents approximately a 170% increase for Humana and 
60% increase for UnitedHealth between 2006 and 2008. It appears that cost-sharing will continue to 
rise in the future. This could drastically affect an individual beneficiary‟s out-of-pocket expense, 
particularly if they were unaware of the increase and did not re-evaluate or switch plans accordingly. 
Increased cost-sharing, without the continued potential for cost-savings due to initial enrollment, can 
cause beneficiaries to face prohibitive cost barriers that may prevent them from obtaining 
medications. If this occurs, Part D may not achieve its intended benefit of improving access to and 
affordability of medications for a population who relies on them to maintain their health. 
 
Part D implementation 
 
Law Architecture 
When the MMA was proposed, the implementation of Part D through the private market was 
heavily debated. Such privatization of a public benefit was unprecedented.
37, 38
 The architecture of the 
benefit relied heavily on the basic assumption that competition among multiple private plans would 
increase efficiency and keep costs down.
8, 29
 The combination of competition and “consumer self-
interest” were intended to make the market “largely self-regulating, with minimal supervision by the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services and its Office of the Inspector General.”39 The resulting 
political compromise dictated that the drug benefit was provided by private companies, but 
12 
 
government would intervene if there were not at least two Part D offerings in a given region.
3
 At the 
time of the legislative debate, it was unclear whether insurance companies would be willing to enter 
the market voluntarily.
12
 However, it was important that multiple plans participated in order to 
produce the necessary competition in the private market. Therefore, CMS created incentives, 
including risk corridors and reinsurance, to ensure market participation. As a result of the 
circumstances, a multitude of plans entered the market. The fact that there exists a multitude of plan 
choices is central to the way in which Part D has affected beneficiaries. 
 
Choosing a Part D plan 
Under traditional health insurance, the purchaser‟s degree of risk aversion influences their 
decision to purchase insurance: more risk averse individuals will be more likely to purchase 
insurance. However, purchasing medication insurance in the Part D market may function differently 
than in the traditional health insurance market because the individuals‟ risk or expected value of loss 
is largely unknown. That is, past medication utilization is generally a good predictor of future 
medication utilization in a chronically-ill elderly population, such that purchasers of medication 
insurance, such as Medicare Part D, may enter the market with a greater degree of certainty.  
Even so, Part D plans can vary with respect to their benefit structure. While they must be at 
least as generous as CMS‟ standard benefit, some plans may waive deductibles while others will not. 
Two actuarially equivalent plans may be structured such that one offers lower premiums, but 
relatively higher copays, while the other has higher premiums and lower copays. These cost structures 
could be a factor when a beneficiary is deciding between plans. Therefore, two “lowest-cost plans” 
may differ in their benefit structure such that their total out-of-pocket costs are similar, but their 
marginal parts (deductible, premium, and copays) differ. 
 
CMS’ implementation strategies for enrollment 
Given this vast array of choices, CMS implemented two strategies to help beneficiaries enroll 
in plans. First, all non-dual beneficiaries who desired coverage were required to choose among plan 
options, with assistance tools including an online plan finder tool and a telephone hotline. Second, all 
dual eligibles were randomly auto-assigned to qualifying PDPs at the start of the benefit.  
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Enrollment assistance for non-duals 
The first enrollment assistance strategy targets the general Medicare population. CMS created 
two tools to help beneficiaries choose between plans. First, they developed a “Prescription Drug Plan 
Finder” (PDPF) tool on Medicare‟s website. This tool, made available in October 2005, was designed 
to help beneficiaries and advocates compare multiple plan options and choose a Part D plan. By 
entering all of one‟s drugs, the output will give information such as drug coverage, estimated annual 
out-of-pocket expense, and pharmacy preferences.
40
 However this tool is greatly underutilized. Just 
before benefit implementation in January 2006, only 6% of seniors had visited the Medicare.gov 
website.
41
 Additionally, 76% of seniors reported that they had never been online.
41
 Even for the small 
number of seniors who could use the Medicare website, 72% of them were unable to successfully 
select a drug plan or had other usage problems that prevented them from selecting a plan.
42
 Therefore, 
despite its abundant information, the PDPF may not be very effective in helping seniors pick plans. 
Second, for beneficiaries who are unable to access this tool online, CMS operates a 1-800-
MEDICARE toll-free phone number. In 2006, only 15% of beneficiaries have called the number, 
which was up from 8% in 2005.
41, 43
 In focus groups, beneficiaries report that calling 1-800-
MEDICARE was frustrating and they remained confused even after the phone call.
25, 44
 In addition, 
beneficiaries are advised to visit their local State Health Insurance Assistance Program (SHIP). 
However, awareness of these programs, and others that provide assistance, is low among 
beneficiaries.
25
  
 
Random auto-assignment for dual eligibles 
Aiming for a smooth transition from Medicaid to Medicare Part D, full duals were randomly 
auto-enrolled into PDPs unless they chose a particular plan on their own, with coverage to begin 
January 1, 2006. Partial duals experienced facilitated enrollment, in which they were given more time 
to choose a plan on their own. Because auto-enrollment and facilitated enrollment are essentially the 
same mechanism, just occurring at two different time points, we refer to them as random auto-
assignment.
45
 If more than one PDP had a premium at or below the LIS amount, the beneficiary was 
randomly assigned among the qualifying plans. All LIS-beneficiaries, even those not auto-enrolled, 
must choose a benchmark plan or they must pay the difference in cost. Notably, all LIS-beneficiaries 
are able to change plans once per month (as compared to others who can only change plans annually 
during the open enrollment). However, while duals are allowed to switch plans monthly, only 11% of 
duals switched plans during 2006.
14
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The rationale for auto-assignment was multi-faceted. First, there was concern about the 
transition from Medicaid to Medicare Part D medication coverage, and auto-assignment ensured that 
all duals were covered by the start of the benefit. Second, auto-assignment allowed plans to save on 
marketing.
8
 Third, equal numbers of duals were assigned to each participating PDP, which distributed 
the beneficiaries equally across plans. Fourth, CMS induced competition by setting the benchmark 
premium, because multiple plans compete to gain access to the LIS-population, whose drug costs are 
mostly subsidized by CMS.
8
 Plans compete to set their bid to CMS at or below the benchmark 
premium if they wish to enroll LIS-eligible individuals. In 2006 in NC, there were 14 benchmark LIS 
plans. In 2008 in NC, 17 of the 51 PDPs were at or below the benchmark premium. In 2009 this 
decreased 11 LIS plans. Each year, some plans may re-set their premium and may not meet the 
benchmark, in which case they can no longer enroll LIS-beneficiaries. From 2007 to 2008, 62% of 
benchmark plans (nationally) retained their status to enroll LIS individuals.
8
  
Each year, a portion of LIS beneficiaries whose plans lose qualifying status must be re-
assigned to a new qualifying plan. From 2006 to 2007, CMS re-assigned 1.1 million beneficiaries. 
From 2007 to 2008, they re-assigned 2.6 million beneficiaries (22% of all LIS).
8
 From 2009 to 2010, 
almost 3 million LIS individuals were affected. 1.06 million had to be reassigned because their plans 
lost benchmark status.
9
 Choosers (the LIS beneficiaries who chose a plan on their own or switched 
out of the initial auto-assignment) are not reassigned if their plan loses benchmark status. Instead, 
they must switch plans on their own or pay the difference to stay in their current plan. 1.7 million 
choosers were in plans at the end of 2009 that didn‟t qualify for 2010. However, they are not 
automatically re-assigned, so they either had to know to choose another plan, or are paying the 
difference in costs.
9
  
Both the enrollment assistance tools and the auto-assignment of duals were intended to 
facilitate beneficiaries getting into plans that met their needs, which is also ideally a lowest-cost plan. 
However, it is not clear that these strategies were effective in helping beneficiaries navigate into 
lowest-cost plans. 
 
Consequences of CMS implementation strategies 
Part D has largely achieved its goal of increasing access to medications. Before Part D, over 
25% of beneficiaries were without drug coverage.
1, 2
 As of February 2009, over 90% of all 
beneficiaries had obtained some form of coverage: 26.7 million people are enrolled in Part D plans, 
while 14.1 million have an alternative other form of drug coverage.
10
 In addition, Part D has increased 
drug use and reduced beneficiary costs.
15, 27, 28
 Those without previous drug coverage benefited the 
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most in terms of increased access to medications with an associated decrease in out-of-pocket 
expense. Despite this success, the multitude of plan options and auto-assignment of duals may have 
led to negative consequences; in particular, enrollees often do not enroll into a lowest-cost plan. In 
addition to the random auto-enrollment of duals without consideration of costs or coverage (described 
above), several other factors may contribute to this issue, including: (1) lack of knowledge; (2) 
practitioners unable to offer adequate assistance; (3) most beneficiaries don‟t switch plans; (4) 
formulary coverage for auto-enrollees; and (5) overwhelming number of choices. 
 
(1) Lack of knowledge 
Polinski, et al. (2010) conduct a systematic literature review examining Part D beneficiaries‟ 
knowledge of the benefit, and how this impacts enrollment decisions and plan choice. They found that 
beneficiaries had considerable confusion surrounding the benefit. A substantial proportion of 
beneficiaries lacked knowledge with regard to the benefit in general, the low-income subsidy, and 
elements of benefit design (most frequently the coverage gap).
46
 Nonwhites, those with lower SES, 
poorer health, and lower cognitive ability had significantly less knowledge of the benefit.
39
 Even after 
enrolling into a plan, beneficiaries may remain confused about details such as payment caps and 
coverage gaps. One study of a MA-PD population reported that only 40% of beneficiaries were aware 
that their plan had a coverage gap and its cost-sharing implications.
47
  
Another study found that 68% of elderly health plan members either did not know that they 
had a payment cap or did not know their cap level if they had one. Although almost all participants 
knew when they exceeded the cap (because their copayments greatly increase), the majority did not 
know beforehand that they were about to hit the cap.
48
 This lack of knowledge may prevent 
beneficiaries, particularly those who are more vulnerable, from enrolling into a plan that best meets 
their needs. This may be problematic for beneficiaries because they may face unexpected costs 
throughout the year that could pose cost-related barriers. The individuals who were unaware more 
often reported having a financial burden.
47
 In general, knowledge of drug benefits is limited and gets 
more limited with increasingly complicated benefit designs.
49
 This is particularly problematic in the 
context of Part D, where over 3 million beneficiaries hit the coverage gap among an elderly 
population that must rely on drug therapies. 
Beneficiaries may also lack appropriate knowledge on how to use their current medication list 
to enroll into a lowest-cost plan. While prescription drug expenses are persistent among the elderly, 
the actual drugs that are prescribed can vary from time to time. Domino et al. (2008) examined this in 
the context of Medicare Part D to determine whether selecting a plan at the beginning of the year may 
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attract an uncertainty loss (financial loss) by the end of the year if medication changes are made 
during the year. 43% of beneficiaries change prescriptions during a given year to the extent that 
another plan would have made more financial sense, with an average loss of $556. Total out-of-
pocket expense due to these changes can drive costs such that beneficiaries would have saved money 
by switching plans.
50
 
 
(2) Practitioners unable to offer adequate assistance 
Between 70-80% of seniors agree that the Medicare drug benefit is too complicated
51, 52
 and 
many lacked basic knowledge and understanding about how the benefit was administered.
41
 Although 
patients trust doctors and pharmacists to provide drug information,
53
 these professionals lack the time 
and/or knowledge to provide adequate Part D enrollment assistance.
25, 41, 51
 
 
(3) Most beneficiaries don’t switch plans 
Beneficiaries who fail to enroll in a lowest-cost-plan have the opportunity to select a better 
plan at re-enrollment. However, despite a significant proportion of beneficiaries not being enrolled in 
lowest-cost plans, only 6-8% switched plans.
14, 54
 Even among LIS-beneficiaries, who are allowed to 
switch their plan each month, only 11% switch in a given year.
14
 Preliminary evidence shows that 
beneficiaries are not re-evaluating plan options each year, which can leave them in plans that are not 
lowest-cost.
55, 56
 One study found that 90% of participants could have saved money by switching 
plans during open enrollment. However, less than half of participants who were eligible to switch 
plans (and therefore save money) chose to do so.
56
 This could have been due to the relatively small 
median savings ($98), but it is also possible that other barriers exist, including: lack of knowledge of 
other options; avoiding the tedious switching process; being afraid that switching would cause worse 
problems; and requiring, but not receiving, assistance to switch.
25, 46, 57
  
It is likely that beneficiaries don‟t switch plans due to the confusion surrounding the complex 
enrollment process
25
 and may be paralyzed by the overwhelming number of options. An 
overwhelming majority of beneficiaries that are surveyed about their intentions to switch plans report 
that they intend to keep their current plan.
46
 Many beneficiaries may be afraid that even if their 
current plan is not perfect, there is no guarantee that a new plan would be any better. In focus groups, 
participants state that they are overwhelmed by the complexity of choosing a new plan, and it was so 
difficult to select a plan at the start of Part D that they did not want to “rock the boat” and try to select 
a new plan, even if they were aware that the costs in their current plan had risen.
25
 Thus, despite the 
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financial consequences of not switching plans, many Part D beneficiaries choose to stay in their plan, 
suggesting other barriers to switching. 
 
(4) Formulary coverage for auto-enrollees 
Duals who were randomly assigned to plans did not have the opportunity to select a plan 
based upon formulary coverage or other benefit design features. Therefore, out-of-pocket expense 
stemming from off-formulary medications may be particularly problematic for these beneficiaries. To 
estimate the frequency with which dually eligible patients are covered by a lowest cost plan, I 
conducted a pilot study.  I found that 9 out of 17 plans were lowest-cost for a given medication list, 
while the others ranged from 220% to 700% higher costs. This cost variation is mainly driven by 
medications that are off-formulary. For all on-formulary medications, the copays for duals are 
standardized to minimal copays (ranging from $1.10-$6.00 in 2009), in which case not only are the 
costs not highly-subsidized by CMS, but they are not covered at all (so the dual eligible will have to 
pay 100% out-of-pocket to obtain the medication.) 
 
(5) Overwhelming number of choices 
Choice is a fundamental tenant upon which Part D is built: there are a multitude of plan 
choices in the private market, and it is the individual beneficiary‟s responsibility to decide which best 
suits their needs. Plan selection directly influences out-of-pocket expense, such that choosing or being 
placed into a plan that does not minimize costs may have detrimental impacts for a beneficiary. Little 
is currently known about how beneficiaries make choices in Part D.
58
 For Part D to function 
according to the economic principles upon which it is based, the following scenario must occur:
39
 
 
“In evaluating Part D alternatives, consumers need to take into account not only 
their current pharmacy bills, but also the probabilities of developing new health 
conditions that will require treatment, and the distribution of costs of these 
treatments. They need to understand the formularies, approval rules, and 
copayment tiers of alternative plans, and how these may change over time. As a 
result, consumers are being asked to make relatively complex plan assessments, 
generally with incomplete information on future prospects.” 
 
Rational choice theory posits that individuals will make choices based upon maximizing their 
utility—maximizing benefit and minimizing cost. Therefore, more choices are better because it 
creates a higher likelihood that a utility-maximizing choice is available for the individual.
52
 This 
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theory rests on the assumptions that: (1) there is sufficient information available to make the choice; 
(2) the individual is able to decide between the choice alternatives; and (3) the individual won‟t regret 
the choices not picked.
52
  
Certainly, offering multiple choices has the potential for making decisions that maximize 
utlility for an individual. However, recent research has begun to challenge whether more choices are 
always better. The notion of “bounded rationality” suggests that cognitive limitations may preclude 
individuals from being able to successfully choose among a multitude of choices. With limited 
memory, time, and knowledge, individuals may not be choosing an option that actually maximizes 
their utility.
52, 59
 Emerging research in decision sciences, psychology, and behavioral economics 
suggest that being presented with too many choices can be problematic, and can cause individuals to 
make decisions that do not maximize their utility.
60-62
 This may particularly be the case for elderly 
individuals, who are likely to have more: (1) chronic conditions; (2) prescribed medications; (3) 
cognitive limitations; and (4) complex decision-making processes.
62
 In these instances, elderly 
decision-makers with more information available to them are less likely to use that information 
effectively.
60
 In addition, individuals may be less likely to participate in markets where they have 
more choice.
37
 One recent working paper, based on laboratory experiments and field data, suggests 
that a larger set of choices is associated with a stronger preference for simple options that are more 
easily understood. This supports the idea that “even though the best option becomes better as the 
choice set becomes larger, the average option becomes worse.” Given this, the person making the 
decision may have a preference to select a simple option when there is a large choice set.
63
 Amid the 
confusion, beneficiaries choose plans based upon brand loyalty, information from a plan‟s agent, or 
other non-systematic approaches, rather than objective criteria regarding cost and/or formulary 
coverage.
44, 46
 
Evidence suggests that elderly beneficiaries are overwhelmed by plan choices and are not 
making efficient choices, which is “inconsistent with optimization under full information.”37 Thus, 
although seniors are expected to choose the plan that best meets their needs (i.e. maximizes their 
utility), they have limited ability to utilize full information, and may be overwhelmed by the 
multitude of plan choices. This “choice overload” may prevent many beneficiaries from enrolling into 
the most rational (generally considered the lowest-cost) plan. Hanoch, et al. (2009) examined the 
issue of “rational” choice in selecting a Medicare Part D plan by conducting an experiment in which 
192 adults (ages 18+) were randomly assigned to a choice set of 3, 10, or 20 plans. Using factual 
questions, they found that just over half of participants (56%) were able to identify the plan in their 
set that minimized total annual cost. After controlling for appropriate covariates, age did not 
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significantly predict the likelihood of successfully identifying a low-cost plan.
58
 In a study in which 
participants were given a set of hypothetical plan options, only 36.3% of those who intended to enroll 
picked a plan that minimized expected present value of annual out-of-pocket costs.
39
 However, 
participants were only presented with 5 options intended to represent key plan features, far fewer than 
the 50-some choices offered to many Part D beneficiaries. It is particularly troublesome that many 
beneficiaries are confused about their plan‟s cost-sharing and their own out-of-pocket costs. In one 
mailed survey, beneficiaries state that copayment amounts were the most important factor influencing 
plan choice.
44, 46
 However, a minority of beneficiaries actually compare costs between plans.
44, 46, 64
 
This could lead to paying more than necessary to obtain necessary medications (differential costs).  
In summary, although Part D was designed to increase access to, and affordability of, 
medications, its complex enrollment process may limit its overall effectiveness. Beneficiaries must 
choose or are randomly-assigned among multiple plan options. Due to variations in formulary and 
benefit design, annual out-of-pocket costs can vary widely between plans. Given the complexities and 
confusion outlined above, it is likely that many are not in plans that minimize their out-of-pocket 
expense. Since Part D aims to improve health outcomes by increasing medication access, suboptimal 
plan choice due to enrollment complexities may lead to CRN, which can in turn lead to worse clinical 
outcomes and increased health services utilization.  
 
Potential consequences of not being in a lowest-cost plan 
Prohibitive cost-sharing has been shown to be associated with higher CRN, increased 
inappropriate health services utilization, and worse health outcomes, as detailed below. These 
relationships will be investigated in this research (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Pathway to be estimated in dissertation study 
 
 
Cost-related nonadherence 
CRN includes skipping doses, stretching between refills (i.e. splitting pills, taking less than 
prescribed) or not filling prescriptions because of costs. Studies have shown CRN to be present in 13-
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25% of elderly beneficiaries, 
2, 14, 65-69
 and it is associated with a lack of prescription drug coverage 
and poorer health.
2, 65, 69-77
 Low-income seniors are particularly vulnerable, as they are 
disproportionately affected by disease burden (including being prescribed more medications than 
younger adults). Among chronically ill beneficiaries, 32% report skipping or reducing doses or not 
refilling a prescription due to cost. 30-50% of those who are also low income do not take drugs as 
prescribed due to cost.
78
 Beneficiaries in poorer health have more, persistent CRN over time.
79
  
 
CRN before Part D 
In a synthesis of published literature about CRN before Part D was implemented, increased 
cost-sharing was associated with decreased adherence and higher likelihood of discontinuing 
therapy,
80
 for both chronic and symptom-management medications.
81
 One study examining the use of 
two different drug types (β-blockers and statins) found a different effect of copayment/coinsurance, 
which was medication-dependent.
82, 83
 Adherence to new statin therapy (a more expensive drug) was 
reduced due to cost-sharing and coinsurance.
83
 Sudden shocks to out-of-pocket spending 
(synonymous to doughnut hole design) can double the risk of stopping a statin. However, adherence 
even before cost-sharing was relatively low (56%), and adherence was not reduced for statin initiation 
after myocardial infarction.
83
 In contrast, there was only a temporary drop in adherence to β-blockers 
after the copayment policy was put into place, but overall use was not affected by copays.
82
 In 
contrast to copays reducing adherence, substitution policies in which a generic drug is used in favor 
of a brand-name drug, can reduce costs without the drop-off in adherence.
84, 85
 Higher copays have 
also been associated with using fewer prescriptions.
16, 24
 In summary, there is good evidence that out-
of-pocket medication expense can decrease use of the medications themselves. Indeed, the goal and 
expectation of Part D was to improve access to medication, thereby decreasing CRN. Unfortunately, 
given the potential barriers to enrolling in a lowest-cost plan, a substantial proportion of beneficiaries 
may have out-of-pocket costs that would serve as a barrier to filling prescriptions, the precise reason 
Part D was implemented. As such, they may experience higher CRN.  
 
Prevalence of CRN after Part D 
Multiple studies have found that, even after Medicare Part D, CRN remains a concern for 
some Part D beneficiaries. In a study using MCBS data to examine rates of self-reported CRN among 
beneficiaries before and after Part D, Madden, et al. (2008) found that the overall prevalence of CRN 
significantly decreased after Part D, though the absolute change was small (from 14.1% to 11.5%). 
This trend did not hold for the sicker subgroups, including the disabled; those in fair to poor health; 
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and those with 4+ comorbidities.
86
 Zhang, et al. (2010) assessed overall adherence (not CRN) using 
the medication possession rate (MPR) among MA-PD enrollees. They find that adherence rates 
(MPR>80%) improved post-Part D, with the largest improvement being for previously-uninsured 
individuals (average change = 13.4 percentage points). However, the improvements were smaller for 
individuals with previous drug coverage, ranging from 4-7 percentage points.
87
 Of note, even the 
post-Part D adherence rates were still considered sub-optimal, even among the previously-insured. 
Other studies find that CRN among Part D beneficiaries varies from 12%-20%, as compared to a 
maximum of 25% before implementation. 
14, 35, 51, 86
 In contrast, only 8% of those with employer-
sponsored benefits and 12% of those with VA drug benefits report experiencing CRN.
14, 35
 
Additionally, 8.7% also report foregoing basic needs to get medications.
86
  
 
Health outcomes 
CRN may also have significant adverse effects on patient health, although results overall are 
mixed.
80
 Restricting medications due to cost is associated with a significant decline in self-reported 
health status over two years as compared to those who had not restricted medications.
5
 Negative 
health outcomes due to cost-sharing can be seen across diseases. In individuals with cardiovascular 
disease, higher rates of angina, nonfatal heart attacks and strokes were reported as a result of CRN.
5
 
Patients with asthma experienced more frequent acute exacerbations after copay increases for their 
asthma medications.
88
 Restricted medication access has even been linked to increased morbidity.
4
 
Among Medicare beneficiaries with diabetes, waiving cost-sharing for ACE-inhibitors was associated 
with increased life-expectancy.
89
 In contrast, studies by Schneeweiss, et al have examined the effects 
of various cost-sharing arrangements and concluded that well-designed policies have the ability to 
save money without adversely affecting patient outcomes.
83, 84, 90
 While the relationship between cost-
sharing and health outcomes may not generalize to all populations, it appears that there can be a 
negative impact on the health of diabetes patients due to medication cost-sharing. 
 
Health services utilization 
Higher medication cost-sharing is associated with increased use of health services across 
studies.
80
 Drug costs and formulary restrictions in particular can have an impact on an individual‟s 
use of health services. Medicare+Choice beneficiaries with a cap on their drug benefit—increasing 
cost-sharing when the gap is hit— used fewer prescription drugs to treat their chronic conditions, but 
had higher rates of emergency department visits, nonelective hospitalizations, and death.
4
 Increases in 
drug cost-sharing are also related to medication adverse events. One study of Canadian elderly found 
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that a new drug policy with cost-sharing requirements significantly reduced essential drug use, while 
increasing acute care hospitalizations, long-term care admissions, and ED visits.
6
 However, increased 
cost-sharing is not always associated with increased hospitalizations;
85
 increased cost-sharing can also 
be associated with more physician visits.
91
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Conceptual model 
Early empirical results suggest that Part D is having success in reducing economic barriers to 
obtaining medications. Since policy implementation, beneficiaries have increased drug use and 
decreased prescription drug spending.
15, 27-29, 31
 Recent research suggests that many beneficiaries may 
not be enrolled into lowest-cost plans given the way in which Part D was implemented, namely the 
multitude of plan options from which beneficiaries must choose, and the random assignment of duals. 
The potential for burdensome costs may result in CRN, which can in turn lead to worse clinical 
outcomes and increased use of health services.  
 
Conceptual basis for research questions 
Much of Part D‟s effectiveness for individual beneficiaries rests upon the assumption that 
they are able to choose and enroll into a plan that meets their needs. This can be defined as being in, 
or close to, a lowest-cost plan, which maximizes drug coverage while minimizing out-of-pocket 
expense. According to the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Ideally, beneficiaries choose a 
plan that provides access to the medications they need at premiums and copays they are willing to 
pay, and then reevaluate the decision from time to time.”9 However, this may not be the case for all 
beneficiaries. This research will examine whether beneficiaries are getting into lowest-cost plans, 
either through making a plan choice or being randomly assigned to a LIS-plan.  
The proportion of beneficiaries in lowest-cost plans is not currently well-understood. In 
addition, there is no research examining whether the random assigning of duals makes them less 
likely to be in a lowest-cost plan. Aim 1 will examine these two research questions. Further, it is not 
known whether the related unnecessary out-of-pocket medication spending may be affecting patient 
outcomes. There are no studies to date that examine the relationship between Medicare Part D plan 
enrollment, out-of-pocket spending, and ultimately patient outcomes; however, examining such 
outcomes in Part D is regarded as a next step for ongoing research.
15
 Aim 2 will address this gap by 
determining the association between lowest-cost plan enrollment/differential costs and CRN. Then, 
the association between CRN and patient outcomes, including clinical outcomes and health services 
use, will be examined. Aim 3 performs the same analyses, but substitutes total out-of-pocket costs 
(rather than differential costs) as the key independent variable. Finally, Aim 4 will determine the 
association between switching plans and differential costs, plan satisfaction, and CRN. The proposed 
research will address these relationships as hypothesized in the conceptual model below. 
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Figure 5: Conceptual model 
 
 
 
This model shows the potential pathways through which plan enrollment and subsequent 
medication costs can affect patient outcomes, including: CRN; clinical control of diabetes and related 
comorbidities; and health services utilization. Differential costs represent the “excess” expense that a 
beneficiary may be subject to if they are not enrolled in a lowest-cost plan. Depending upon the 
magnitude of these differential costs, CRN may result. This can then lead to increased utilization 
(measured as inpatient and outpatient visits) or worse clinical outcomes relevant to diabetes (HbA1c, 
cholesterol, and blood pressure).  
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Significance and implications 
 
Contribution to the literature 
Aim 1: To date, three studies have estimated the proportion of Part D beneficiaries in the 
lowest-cost plans.
37, 38, 56
 Gruber, et al. (2009) found that only 6-9% of beneficiaries were enrolled in 
lowest-cost plans with absolute differential costs between $360-$520.
38
 They suggest that “choice 
across such a wide range of Part D plan options may not be in the best interest of beneficiaries who 
are looking to maximize their savings.”38 In a longitudinal study using prescription drug records from 
2005 (pre-Part D), Abaluck & Gruber (2009) examine drug utilization from that year and a Part D 
beneficiary‟s initial plan choice. They find that only 12.2% of their sample chose the lowest-cost 
plan, and participants could have saved 30.9% of their Part D expenditures by being in a lowest-cost 
plan instead.
37
 Patel, et al. (2009) evaluated a tool that assisted Part D beneficiaries in PDP selection 
during open enrollment.
56
 They measure the “potential annual cost savings” that would be incurred by 
being in a lowest-cost plan. Cost savings are defined as the cost of staying in the current PDP in 2008 
minus the cost of the least expensive PDP in 2008, without making any drug changes and using the 
online plan finder tool. It is therefore very similar to my differential costs measure. They find that 
only 10.3% of participants were enrolled in the lowest-cost PDP, with a median potential cost savings 
of $98. However, potential savings varied by clinical characteristics, with individuals taking less than 
3 medications having a median of $79, and those taking above 7 medications having a median of 
$318, up to a maximum of $9849 (therefore a very skewed distribution of potential cost savings).
56
  
The results of these three studies suggest that only a small minority of beneficiaries (6-12%) 
are in lowest-cost plans. The rest are paying more than necessary to obtain their medications, and 
these extra costs are often substantial. Aim 1 of this study will examine the same question and can 
add to this recent literature by corroborating these findings with a different study sample. This 
research will also add to the literature in this area by reporting the results of a survey question that 
directly asks participants how they chose their plan at the start of the benefit. This open-ended 
question provides insight into the ways in which beneficiaries are making enrollment decisions. 
Additionally, I collected data about whether participants had help choosing plans and if so, who 
helped them. These types of details concerning plan enrollment have not yet been reported in the 
literature. 
 
Aims 2 & 3: These aims examine whether patients‟ medication-related costs (i.e., being in a 
lowest-cost plan, differential costs, and total out-of-pocket-costs) are associated with CRN, clinical 
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outcomes and health services use. Yang, et al. (2009) conducted a study in which they examined 
which patient characteristics were significantly associated with nonadherence among Part D 
beneficiaries with diabetes. Their results show that being younger (<65 years old), Black/Hispanic, 
female, and sicker, were associated with a greater likelihood of being nonadherent to oral 
hypoglycemic agents.
92
 However, this study examined a measure of general adherence, rather than 
CRN. This dissertation can add to the current literature by examining CRN among Part D 
beneficiaries with diabetes, and will also examine demographic predictors that may predict CRN. The 
second part of Aims 2 & 3 address the relationship between CRN and health outcomes as a result of 
Part D policy implementation. To date, there is little empirical research to support the presumed 
association between prescription drug coverage and health outcomes. It is important to understand the 
longer-term effects of Part D, by examining whether the policy can improve quality of care and 
subsequent health outcomes.
12
 Kahn, et al. (2008) try to address this gap in the literature by 
examining the effect of prescription drug insurance on health outcomes (as measured by self-reported 
health status) in an elderly, nationally-representative sample, and find no significant relationship. 
However, this study used pre-Part D data.
93
 This study adds to the literature by examining the impact 
of Part D enrollment decisions on patient-level outcomes, including CRN, clinical outcomes, and 
health services utilization.  
 
Aim 4: This aim examines plan switching. In the published literature, it is clear that rates of 
switching are low.
14, 46
 More specifically, Patel, et al. (2009) find that, despite the assistance offered 
to switch plans, only 44.7% of the 123 participants eligible to switch plans did so. Those who 
switched realized significantly higher cost savings than those who did not switch.
56
 This research can 
add to the literature by examining the potential impact of previous plan switches as they may relate to 
differential costs, CRN, and current plan satisfaction. 
 
Diabetes as a disease model 
Diabetes will be used as a disease model because of its prevalence, morbidity, mortality, and 
cost. Diabetes is a metabolic disorder in which hyperglycemia results from defects with insulin 
secretion and/or insulin action. In 2005, 20.8 million people, or 7% of the population, had diabetes. 
However, 6.2 million of these people have not yet been diagnosed with the disease.
94
 The elderly are 
disproportionately affected by diabetes. Among this age group (60+ years old), 10.3 million people 
(20.9%) have diabetes. The prevalence of diabetes among Medicare beneficiaries increased 36% 
between 1993 and 2001.
95
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Diabetes results in extensive morbidity and mortality. In 2005, the age-adjusted diabetes 
death rate was 24.6 per 100,000 for the United States, and 26.0 per 100,000 in North Carolina.
96
 
Clinical outcomes (blood glucose, blood pressure, lipid levels) are sensitive to CRN. Moreover, poor 
adherence to oral antihypoglycemics has been associated with poorer patient outcomes, including 
higher: A1c and LDL-C values; rates of hospitalization,
97
 and even mortality.
98
 
In 2002, diabetes accounted for $92 billion in direct medical costs.
94
 The costs associated 
with treating diabetes are significant for Medicare (CMS). In 2001, 30% of high-cost beneficiaries 
had diabetes, as compared to 16% of low-cost beneficiaries.
99
 Diabetes drugs have recently overtaken 
cholesterol drugs as the leading drivers of pharmaceutical spending growth. Spending on diabetes 
drugs increased 12% in 2007, mostly due to a shift in newer expensive drugs (and the corresponding 
new generic lipid-lowering agents).
100
 This trend shows no signs of slowing, as there are multiple new 
diabetes medications, all of which will cost more that older treatment options (and are not available 
generically).
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In addition to the prevalence, morbidity, and costs, diabetes is also a logical disease model in 
which to study Part D. There is wide variability in medication coverage across plans for oral 
hypoglycemic agents. In an analysis of the variation in formulary coverage among 13 of 14 
benchmark LIS plans in NC (2007), the coverage of diabetes prescriptions ranged from 44% to 94% 
(mean = 0.61, SD = 0.15) [unpublished results]. Many glucose lowering agents do not have a generic 
equivalent, which can increase costs for beneficiaries because brand-name drugs are more expensive 
to obtain (for both copay and coinsurance amounts). 
 
Policy implications 
The proposed study addresses several important policy questions for CMS. In a 2006 report 
for a bipartisan health policy conference, it was said that, “Ultimately, [Part D‟s] success will be 
judged by whether beneficiaries enroll in plans that meet their needs and whether the program‟s costs 
are held within reasonable limits.”102 The results of this study directly address the first part of that 
statement, by examining the impact of Part D enrollment policies on the beneficiary experience and 
subsequent outcomes. This study will address whether beneficiaries are able to navigate into plans 
that adequately meet their needs, assessed by whether they are in or near lowest-cost plans. If there is 
evidence that lowest-cost plan enrollment is directly associated with CRN, or indirectly associated 
with clinical outcomes, or health services utilization, CMS will be better informed as to whether Part 
D is achieving its potential to improve the quality of care and health of its Medicare beneficiaries. 
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For the dually eligible, study results may have implications for the current random auto-
enrollment process. If a significant proportion of beneficiaries are not in lowest-cost plans, CMS has 
the ability to facilitate beneficiary-centered assignment, rather than random auto-assignment, to 
ensure that enrollees are in a lowest-cost plan. MedPAC is currently evaluating the impact of 
beneficiary-centered assignment on medication access in a study for CMS.
8
 CMS could facilitate 
enrollment into an individual‟s lowest-cost plan based on their current medication list. Although the 
use of current medications may not be ideal,
50
 it is the best directed enrollment mechanism available 
to date. This could be done using administrative prescription drug event data, matched to formulary 
information, for each beneficiary.  
For other (non-dual) beneficiaries, study results may also be relevant to enrollment processes. 
CMS recognizes that there are “potentially too many choices” for beneficiaries with regard to plan 
selection and have responded by slightly reducing the number of plan offerings by rejecting more 
duplicate applications.
103
 However, there is a potential for more action to be taken in this regard. 
There has been some interest in simplifying Part D choices such that the program becomes more 
consumer-friendly. This could be achieved in multiple ways: (1) offering the drug benefit under 
original Medicare, either in conjunction with or replacing the private Part D market; (2) limiting the 
number of plans or standardizing the offerings.
12
 Some research suggests that restricting a 
beneficiary‟s choice set may better serve their interest.37 As an alternative to reducing plan offerings 
or simplifying choice, CMS could enhance and improve upon decision-making tools for seniors and 
their caregivers. If this study indicates that a large proportion of beneficiaries are enrolling into non-
lowest-cost plans, CMS can develop further education and outreach materials, or improve their 
dissemination and use.  
This will be the first study to enroll a cohort of patients with Medicare Part D and to be able 
to link their plan choice with CRN, clinical outcomes, and health services utilization. The results of 
this study can also be used to extend what is currently known about Medicare Part D with regard to 
medical costs and clinical outcomes. Until June 2008, drug claims data were being used for payment 
(administrative) purposes only. While Part D data have recently been made available to researchers, 
there is currently no ability to link individual beneficiaries to specific plans.
104
 While claims data are 
available, this study is unique in its ability to link individual-level plan and cost data with medical 
record data, including clinical outcomes. More broadly, the evaluation of Medicare Part D can teach 
us valuable lessons in the context of health reform. The newly-enacted legislation includes the 
provision of insurance partly through health insurance exchanges at the state level, called “American 
Health Benefit Exchanges.” The structure of these Exchanges bears many similarities to the way in 
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which Part D is delivered. Specifically, individuals can purchase insurance in the Exchange 
marketplace, in which the federal government will contract with private insurers to offer at least two 
plans in each Exchange. Plans offered will be required to meet a minimum standard (such as the 
standard benefit in Part D). Competition is a hallmark of the functioning of Exchanges, and is 
intended to keep the price of coverage down. In these key aspects, the delivery of health insurance 
will be similar to the delivery of prescription drug insurance under Part D. Therefore, it is crucial to 
understand the ways in which policy implementation of Part D is having an impact on beneficiaries. 
The observed complexities associated with plan choice, information overload, and enrollment 
decisions have the potential to carry over into the new health insurance marketplace as well. Given 
this, it is of paramount importance to understand the ways in which Part D may affect beneficiary 
enrollment decisions, out-of-pocket costs, and patient outcomes. This study will directly address this 
knowledge gap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 
Study design 
This study examined the impact of lowest-cost plan enrollment, differential costs, and total 
out-of-pocket costs on patients‟ CRN, clinical parameters, and health services utilization. This was 
conducted among elderly Medicare Part D beneficiaries with diabetes receiving primary care in the 
General Internal Medicine or Family Medicine practices at UNC-Chapel Hill. The study had two 
parts. First, eligible patients were invited to participate in a survey about their Medicare Part D plan 
(i.e., current plan, whether they switched, how they enrolled, satisfaction, and CRN (Appendix A).  
Second, for patients who returned HIPAA authorization, we abstracted chart data from 
UNC‟s electronic medical record (WebCIS), including prescribed medications, clinical parameters, 
and health services utilization. Data were collected at baseline (date of survey) as well as 6 months 
before and after the survey date (pre and post period, retrospectively). We extracted clinical and 
utilization data during a + 2-month window surrounding both the pre and post period date (Figure 6). 
In addition, we estimated actual and lowest possible out-of-pocket medication costs for each subject‟s 
prescribed drugs using a publicly-available online CMS tool. The study was approved by the UNC 
Public Health-Nursing IRB; The Division of General Medicine & Clinical Epidemiology Research 
Committee; and the Family Medicine Center Studies Oversight Committee. 
 
Figure 6: Data collection 
 
  
 
6 months
Chart abstraction #1
“pre” period
Chart abstraction #2
“post” period
Survey
date
± 2 months
6 months
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Study sites 
Participants included patients with diabetes who received care at one of two primary care 
clinics at UNC Chapel Hill: the Internal Medicine Clinic or the Family Medicine Center. Each of 
these practices maintains a diabetes registry that is used for clinical and quality improvement 
purposes.  
 
Study sample 
Participants were eligible for the study if they met the following inclusion criteria: (1) 
received primary care from UNC Chapel Hill‟s General Internal Medicine or Family Medicine 
practices and (2) had ≥ 1 visit in the 12 months preceding receipt of registry data, to ensure that 
patients were currently receiving care at UNC; (3) had a diagnosis of diabetes, as defined by being in 
the General Internal Medicine or Family Medicine Diabetes Registries; (4) were > 65 years old. 
Potential participants were excluded if they were: (1) eligible for Medicare due to disability status 
alone (because they are likely to be systematically different from elderly beneficiaries, including 
more prescribed medications;
14, 105
 (2) non-English speaking; (3) unable to participate on a phone 
interview due to a hearing or cognitive deficit; or (4) non-community dwelling. For potentially-
eligible patients, we obtained basic contact information from the diabetes registries. Eligibility was 
confirmed during the initial telephone contact. 
 
Data collection procedures  
 
(1) Overview of data sources 
This study combines data from three distinct sources: participant surveys; publicly-available 
Part D plan data; and UNC medical records. For UNC medical record data, I manually abstracted 
medication data for use in CMS‟ online Prescription Drug Plan Finder (PDPF) tool. This is a website 
into which a beneficiary can enter all of their medications to obtain annual cost estimates for all plans 
available in their area. Then, I worked with the Carolina Data Warehouse for Health (CDW-H) to 
abstract all other clinical and utilization data elements. All data sources were merged to create an 
analytic file with individual-level, longitudinal clinical data and cross-sectional survey and cost data. 
All registry data, recruitment call logs and tracking, and survey data were stored in a Microsoft 
Access relational database. Ultimately, data from all sources were linked to a final de-identified 
dataset that resides on a secure server.  
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(2) Recruitment process 
The protocol was specifically designed to minimize the burden on both Internal 
Medicine/Family Medicine staff and patients, i.e., there was no data collection in the clinics. Rather, 
all data were collected by telephone or electronic medical record abstraction. 
1. The General Internal Medicine and Family Medicine diabetes registries were used to obtain basic 
contact information (name, phone number, address) for all patients ≥ 65 years.  
2. Potential participants were mailed a letter on Internal Medicine or Family Medicine letterhead, 
signed by the clinic director (Appendix B; Appendix C). This letter explained the study and stated 
that potential participants have the ability to opt out of being contacted by calling a toll-free 
number. The introductory mailing included the letter, 2 copies of a HIPAA authorization form 
(Appendix E), and a handout of sample Part D cards to help participants identify their Part D plan 
(Appendix D), and a $5 gift card to either WalMart or CVS. Letters were sent in waves of 60 per 
mailing, so that the initial phone contact could occur within 1-2 weeks of receiving the letter. 
3. Potential participants were contacted by phone after receiving the introduction letter, unless they 
called the toll-free phone number to opt out of the study. If potential participants were not 
contacted after 6 attempts, they were classified as unable to be reached. 
4. Verbal consent for survey participation was obtained by asking individuals whether they agree to 
participate at the start of the phone call. The beginning of the phone script contained standard 
consent language as is used in IRB written consent forms. For those participants who verbally 
consented to participate in the phone interview and had Part D, a short telephone survey was 
conducted. 
5. Part D plan information was obtained from participants, via the process described in the (3b) 
Obtaining plan information section. 
6. Upon completion of the phone interview, participants were asked for consent to access their 
medical record. If they agreed, they were asked to return a signed copy of the HIPAA 
authorization form in the addressed, stamped envelope. Study participants who had not returned 
HIPAA forms after two weeks received follow-up phone calls until the forms were received. We 
mailed new HIPAA forms when requested.  
7. After receipt of the HIPAA form, manual and electronic chart abstractions were conducted using 
data from UNC‟s electronic medical record, using either WebCIS or the CDW-H. 
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8. For each individual, total out-of-pocket costs and lowest medication costs for all prescribed 
medications were estimated using CMS‟ online Formulary Plan Finder tool (Appendix G).  
9. All data (survey, WebCIS, CDW-H, PDPF) were merged into a single database that was housed 
on a secure server for analyses. 
 
(3) Telephone surveys 
Telephone surveys, conducted by trained interviewers, were designed to take 10-15 minutes. 
The survey (Appendix A) assessed the following: (a) satisfaction with current plan; (b) whether they 
have switched plans in the past year and if so, why; (c) how they initially chose a Part D plan; (d) 
whether they had help choosing a plan and if so, from whom; (e) whether they receive extra help 
(low-income subsidy); (f) cost-related nonadherence; (g) whether they substitute generic equivalents; 
(h) self-reported health status; and (i) the name of their current Medicare Part D plan. Operational 
definitions for all variables are presented in the Variables and measures section. When possible, 
validated instruments were used. 
Survey methodology used Dillman‟s tailored design method (2000) to maximize response 
rate by evoking respondent trust and social exchange principles for survey design.
106
 Participants 
should feel that the reward for responding will outweigh anticipated costs, and this can be 
accomplished through development of the survey specifically with elderly Medicare respondents in 
mind. One way to establish trust is to provide the incentive in advance.
106
 The incentive for 
participation in this study was a $5 gift card to either CVS or WalMart, included with the initial 
introduction letter mailing, rather than after survey completion. Phone interviews are considered an 
ideal mode of obtaining information from elderly participants.
106
 Survey questions were also written 
to be mindful of low education levels. 
  
(3a) Survey pilot testing 
Based on a pilot test with 20 participants, we modified the survey. Our main concern was that 
participants had trouble identifying whether they had Part D and/or which plan they had. Thus, the 
interview script was modified to more clearly describe Part D (See (3b) Obtaining plan information 
section). In addition, in the introduction letter we included a handout containing pictures of sample 
cards that highlighted where to find the contract and plan identification number (Appendix D). 
Another change that arose out of pilot-testing was the issue of switching to generics. Many 
participants mentioned that they asked their physician/pharmacist to take generics wherever possible. 
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This was added as a separate question so that it can be quantified in the analyses. Other small 
modifications included shortening the introductory script and adding a prompting question to help 
participants remember receiving the letter. The time to initial contact was also modified from two 
weeks to one week to help with participant recall. 
  
(3b) Obtaining plan information 
Given the importance of accurately identifying participants‟ plan name and contract/plan ID 
numbers, as described above, we included a handout of sample cards in the initial mailing with 
MedicareRx logo and ID numbers were located. During the interviews, we began by asking whether 
participants knew the name of their plan using the following questions: (a) What does it say at the top 
of your card? (plan name); (b) Do you see the MedicareRx logo on your card? (to ensure it was a Part 
D plan/card); (c) What are the plan and contract ID numbers on the bottom of the card? (these 
uniquely identify a specific plan within a given company‟s set of up to 3 plans). We verified the 
accuracy of the plan information (plan and contract ID numbers) from their Part D card using lists of 
available PDPs/MA-PDs/SNPs in North Carolina. If the participant stated that they did not keep their 
card, but rather a family member or pharmacist had the card, we contacted the pharmacy/family 
member with verbal permission from the participant. In many cases, multiple phone calls were 
needed to obtain plan information, for instance if the participant did not have their card at the 
moment, or if a family member kept the card.  
In a few cases for individuals with MA-PDs, WebCIS was used to verify plan identity. 
Because UNC Health Care bills Medicare Advantage for medical care, this information was kept on 
file in WebCIS. In a small minority of cases, the information obtained from multiple sources 
conflicted. In these cases, the order of information used was: (1) Survey (either study participant or 
family member); (2) WebCIS; (3) pharmacy. The pharmacy was a difficult way of obtaining exact 
plan information because they do not keep actual plan names and ID numbers on file. Rather, they 
send their claims to an intermediary pharmacy benefit manager, which uses a different ID numbers 
for each plan. Finally, in some cases we could elicit the only the contract (company) ID, but not the 
specific plan ID. Because a company could offer up to three specific insurance products, we averaged 
the costs of the available products offered by that company.  
35 
 
 
(4) Medical record data 
WebCIS is UNC‟s electronic medical record, from which the clinical and utilization variables 
were abstracted (Table 2). The data was obtained in two ways: via manual abstraction of the medical 
record (for medications and basic demographics), and the CDW-H for all other data elements. 
 
(4a) Manual abstraction of WebCIS 
I manually abstracted active medications, Medicaid status, and zip code from WebCIS for 
each participant who returned a signed HIPAA waiver form. Active medications include all Part D 
medications that are prescribed to the participant as of their survey date. This manual abstraction was 
necessary so that medications could be entered in to the CMS online Prescription Drug Plan Finder 
(PDPF) tool to obtain all cost estimates. By performing manual abstractions, I was able to see all 
physician notes to the pharmacist about the prescribed medication, as well as sort through active and 
inactive medications. Sorting through inactive medications was necessary when abstractions were 
occurring after the survey data if a participant had an office visit, with medication changes, since the 
survey date. In this case, it was necessary to obtain the inactive medication list to ensure that the 
active medication list as of the survey date was used for all participants to ensure comparability. This 
ensured that most accurate prescribed medication was entered into the PDPF tool as of the survey 
date, from which costs were calculated.  
 
(4b) Carolina Data Warehouse for Health (CDW-H) 
The CDW-H is a retrospective record of cleansed data that comes from multiple UNC Health 
Care Systems electronic databases. I requested the data elements (clinical parameters, utilization, 
comorbidities, demographics, whether died during study period) and the medical record numbers for 
the participants who signed HIPAA waiver forms. The programmer provided me with data sets at 
three points during the study. Per the user agreement, I transferred all of my data to the medical 
school (CDW-H) server, linked the files, and performed analyses with the data in this location. The 
final, de-identified dataset was transferred back to the Sheps Center server. Permission to use the 
CDW-H was granted from the Operations Committee. 
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(5) Cost calculations using CMS data 
The PDPF tool was used to calculate both actual medication costs and lowest medication 
costs for each individual. In 2008, out-of-pocket costs were added to the calculator tool, so that an 
individual can put in their full list of medications and find out their lowest-cost plan, as well as the 
annual costs for each of the plans offered in their county (PDPs, MA-PDs, and SNPs). In consultation 
with clinical pharmacists at UNC, a set of decision rules were developed to ensure consistency in the 
way in which medications were entered into the PDPF tool (Appendix F). Decisions were made to 
provide conservative cost estimates. For example, all medications prescribed on an “as needed” basis 
were entered as only being filled once per year. This way, we captured whether the medication was 
on formulary, but maintained a conservative cost estimate. All costs are calculated from prescribed 
medications, rather than from filled prescriptions.  
 
The following steps were followed in using the PDPF tool: 
1. Navigate to www.medicare.gov/MPDPF/Home.asp 
2. Step 1: Select a search option: The “General Plan Search” option was selected because 
information from an individual‟s Medicare card was not obtained. 
3. The following were used as inputs in Step 2: Enter the requested information: 
a. Zip code: person-specific, obtained from WebCIS 
b. Age range: not selected (no input is required) 
c. Health status: not selected (no input is required) 
d. “Do you currently have prescription drug coverage:” For individuals with a MA-PD 
or SNP, the option “yes—Medicare Health Plan” was selected. For those with PDPs, 
“I don‟t know” was selected. This selection allowed for easier access to MA-PD 
plans, as PDPs were the default output unless this option was specified for MA-PD 
participants. 
e. “Do you have any other health insurance coverage:” This was automatically filled in 
for MA-PD participants, and “I don‟t know” was selected for PDP participants. 
f. “Did you get a letter from Medicare or the Social Security Administration (SSA) that 
said you are either eligible for or qualified for extra help paying for your Medicare 
Prescription Drug Plan costs?:” This answer was person-specific, and varies based on 
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Medicaid status. Medicaid status was assessed from the registry and confirmed from 
WebCIS data. For those who are dually enrolled into Medicare and Medicaid, the 
“yes” option was selected, then “Medicare in response to “Who sent you the letter?” 
Lastly, in response to “What kind of help do you get?” “Medicare and Medicaid” was 
selected. For those who are not dually-eligible but responded that they received extra 
help, the “Social Security Administration” option was selected in response to the 
question “Who sent you the letter?” For these participants, the following options 
were selected for the subsequent pop-up questions: Notice of awardpartial 
help50%. 
g. Step 2a: Select county: For individuals who live in a zip code that spans more than 
one county, their appropriate county was selected (county information obtained from 
manual WebCIS abstraction) 
h. The individual‟s Medicare Advantage plan was selected on the next page for those 
with MA-PD/SNP plans. 
4. Step 3: Review Current Coverage and Consider Options: click continue to proceed with 
entering medication list 
a. Under “Get Drug Costs for Available Plans,” the option “Enter my drugs” was 
selected. 
b. Each of the Part D drugs from an individual‟s drug list was entered into this query.  
5. Costs were calculated with the option “Use lower cost generic drugs when available” both 
checked and unchecked. This step then shows which of the drugs are brand name only, 
generic, or have a generic equivalent. Sensitivity analyses will determine whether this has a 
significant impact on different cost estimates. 
6. The dosages and quantity/month (days supply) were entered as taken from the medication 
list. The medication list was abstracted from WebCIS for the participant‟s survey date. In 
many cases, the abstraction occurred after this date (because we had to wait for HIPAA to be 
returned). In these cases, I retrieved the inactive medications list to ensure that the 
medications entered into the PDPF tool were the medications that the participant was taking 
as of their survey date. 
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7. The security password was set as Jan 1, 1900 for all participants. This returns a medication 
list-specific ID number, which can be used to pull up an individual‟s medication list upon 
revisiting the site.  
8. In response to the question “Do you want to select a specific pharmacy or pharmacies from 
which you prefer to purchase your drugs?” “no” was entered. This allows for the largest array 
of plan options to be returned and assumes that the individual is filling their prescriptions at a 
retail pharmacy (and not via mail-order). 
9. The personalized list for an individual was returned at this point. This returns the information: 
Plan name and ID numbers; Estimated annual cost, which included the monthly premiums. 
10. The plan/contract ID and estimated annual costs were recorded for both the actual plan and 
lowest-cost plan. 
 
Variables and measures 
Data for this study came from three sources: participant interviews, CMS‟ online PDPF, and 
the UNC medical record (via WebCIS abstraction or CDW-H) (Table 2). Notably, data obtained from 
the medical record were collected at two time points: six months before and six months after an 
individual‟s interview date, with a 2-month window around each of those pre and post dates (Figure 
6). 
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Table 1: Variables used in multivariate regressions 
 
 
Cost variables 
 
Definition of a Part D drug: The medication list was obtained from WebCIS via manual 
chart abstraction. Only Part D medications were used, according to the standard definition of a Part D 
drug: “a Part D drug is a drug that is approved by the Food and Drug Administration, for which a 
prescription is required, and for which payment is required under Medicaid. Biological products, 
including insulin and insulin supplies, and smoking cessation drugs are also covered under Part D.”107 
Prescription drugs not covered by Part D were excluded, such as those used for hair growth, fertility 
promotion, and drugs covered by Medicare Parts A and B. This definition for medication regimen 
included most—but not all—chronic medications (for example, benzodiazepines are excluded from 
coverage) that are available by prescription only. Over-the-counter medications, vitamins, and herbals 
were excluded, per the Part D regulations. In addition, we decided to exclude antibiotics that are 
clearly used in the short-term only. Medications that were prescribed “as needed” were entered into 
the PDPF tool as being filled only once per year, rather than monthly. These considerations produced 
a conservative estimate of medication costs. (See Appendix F for all decision rules).  
 
Dependent Variables
Lowest-cost plan enrollment 1 PDPF Being in a plan with costs within 10% of the annual out-of-pocket costs in a lowest-cost plan
Differential costs 4 PDPF Total out-of-pocket costs - lowest costs
Cost-related nonadherence 2,3,4 survey Self-report of experiencing any of 3 cost-related behaviors
Clinical outcomes CDW-H
2,3 HbA1c
2,3 Systolic & diastolic BP 
2,3 Total; LDL; HDL; triglycerides
Self-reported health status 2,3 survey Single-item question in which participants rate their general health
Health services utilization CDW-H
2,3 Number of stays to UNC hospital
2,3 Number of visits to any UNC clinic
Plan satisfaction 4 survey Self-reported satisfaction with current plan (1-5 Likert scale)
Key Independent Variables
Dual eligibility 1 WebCIS; CDW-H Receives Medicaid (full dual status)
Lowest-cost plan enrollment 2 PDPF Being in a plan with costs within 10% of the annual out-of-pocket costs in a lowest-cost plan
Differential costs 2 PDPF Total out-of-pocket costs - lowest costs
Total out-of-pocket costs 3 PDPF Total annual medication expense in beneficiary’s current plan
Previously switched plans 4 survey Yes or no (in past year)
Control Variables
Medication expense 1,2,3,4 WebCIS; PDPF Annual medication expense in beneficiary’s lowest-cost plan
Comorbidities 1,2,3,4 CDW-H Charlson comorbidity index
Plan enrollment 1,2,3,4 survey Informed choice; random choice; insurance agent
Patient characteristics
1,2,3,4 CDW-H Calculated from birth date, at time of survey
1,2,3,4 registry Male or female
1,2,3,4 CDW-H White or non-white
1,2,3,4 CDW-H Married or single
Dual eligibility 2,3,4 WebCIS; CDW-H Receives Medicaid (full dual status)
Clinic affiliation 1,2,3,4 registry Internal Medicine or Family Medicine
Plan type 1,2,3,4 survey Medicare Advantage or stand-alone PDP
     Age
     Gender
     Race
     Marital status
     Diabetes
     Blood pressure
     Lipids
     Inpatient stays
     Outpatient visits
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Standardizing cost estimates to 2009: Data related to costs were collected in 2008 and 
2009.  However, out-of-pocket costs can vary across years, even if the medication list and PDP were 
unchanged, because there may be differences in formulary and benefit design across years. Therefore, 
it was necessary to standardize cost estimates across time. This was done using data collected by the 
SeniorPharmAssist program in Durham, NC during open enrollment for the upcoming 2008 benefit 
period. We examined cost estimates for individuals in 2008 and 2009, holding person, plan, and 
medication list constant. A median percentage increase from 2008 to 2009 was calculated, and this 
inflation factor was applied to all individuals in the study sample for whom data were collected in 
2008.  
 
Figure 7: Definition of cost variables 
 
 
All cost variables were estimated by entering the WebCIS medication lists into the PDPF tool. These 
calculations were each made twice: once assuming that prescriptions were filled as written (“as 
written”), and again with all possible generic substitutions (“generic”). 
 
Total out-of-pocket costs: This is a continuous variable that indicates the total annual 
medication expense in beneficiary‟s current plan. (See (3b) Obtaining plan information section for 
details on self-reported plan information). This assumes filling all Part D medications as prescribed 
annually. This variable was obtained using the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan Finder tool, and was 
calculated as both “as written” and “generic”. It is used at the key independent variable in aim (3a). 
 
Medication expense: This is defined as the annual medication expense in a beneficiary‟s 
lowest-cost plan. It was used as a control variable as a measure of the expense that would be required 
Medication expense Differential costs
Total out-of-pocket costs
$0
Lowest-cost plan Current plan
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to fills all medications prescribed in WebCIS. It was used assuming “as written” fills in the “as 
written” models, and assuming all possible generic substitutions in the “generic” models. 
 
Lowest-cost plan enrollment: For the medications prescribed to an individual in WebCIS, we 
used the PDFP to calculate the total out-of-pocket costs (including premium) of: (1) a lowest-cost 
plan in which a person could be enrolled (there may be more than one lowest-cost plan) and (2) the 
plan in which they were actually enrolled. Based upon the difference of these two costs, we created a 
dichotomous variable to reflect whether the individual was in a plan within 10% of the annual out-of-
pocket costs in a lowest-cost plan. This variable is used as the dependent variable in aim (1) and as 
the key independent variable in aim (2a). 
 
Differential costs: I calculated the difference between total out-of-pocket costs and the annual 
costs that would be incurred in a lowest-cost plan (using the PDPF tool). This continuous variable, 
which is measured in dollars, can range from $0 to thousands of dollars. This variable is used as the 
dependent variable in aim (1) and (4a) and as the key independent variable in aim (2b). 
 
Other key dependent variables 
 
Cost-related nonadherence (CRN): CRN was based on a previously validated measure of 
medication adherence that was added to the MCBS in 2004 (Access to Care section).
65
 The original 
measure was developed for a large national survey
2, 67
 and showed good construct validity and test-
retest reliability.
2, 65, 108
 We only asked questions that assessed cost-related reasons for non-adherence. 
These included: (1) skipping doses; (2) failing to fill/refill prescription due to cost; (3) taking smaller 
doses of meds to make prescription last longer. For each question, the respondent could answer: “yes, 
often,” “yes, sometimes,” or “no.” I created a summary dichotomous measure in which a person was 
classified as having CRN if they answered affirmatively to any of the three questions. 
 
Clinical outcomes: Three diabetes-related clinical outcomes were measured. First, 
glycosylated hemoglobin level (HbA1c) measures long-term (approximately 2-month) glycemic 
control. American Diabetes Association clinical practice recommendations recommends that A1c be 
measured twice yearly if controlled or quarterly if therapy has changed or not controlled. Second, I 
obtained systolic and diastolic blood pressure measures, which are generally taken at each clinic 
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visit.
109
 Finally, I obtained data on low density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol, which is also 
recommended at least annually.
109
 I chose these three measures because they are clinically important 
outcomes for patients with diabetes (i.e., associated with morbidity) and (2) it is reasonable to expect 
that there will be at least one measurement of each clinical value being collected per patient per year. 
As shown in Figure 6, we obtained all clinical parameters within 2-months of the pre and post period 
date. For participants with multiple lab values, they were all collected and averaged. 
In primary analyses, all clinical values were used continuously to increase the ability to detect 
a significant effect. When using longitudinal data from both the pre and post periods, the difference 
between the two values was used as the dependent variable to detect whether a change occurred 
during the study period. While each of these values can be dichotomized based on current clinical 
guidelines, these analyses were considered secondary to the continuous difference variables. 
 
Self-reported health status: The participant interviews asked: “In general, would you say your 
health is: excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” The responses were dichotomized as “fair” and 
“poor” versus “good,” “very good,” and “excellent.”110 The use of this single-item has been shown to 
be a good predictor of mortality,
111
 hospitalizations, and outpatient visits.
110
  
 
Health services utilization: There were two measures of utilization collected from the CDW-
H: inpatient stays and outpatient visits that occurred during the study period. Inpatient stays was 
dichotomized to indicate whether the participant had any inpatient stays in the given time period. 
Outpatient visits was used as a continuous variable indicating the count of any clinic visit that a 
participant had to any UNC clinic in the given time period. Outpatient visits are not differentiated by 
type of clinic because I do not hypothesize that there are differential visits by clinic type, and I am not 
transferring outpatient visits to an estimated utilization expenditure (in which case clinic type would 
need to be taken into account). Both variables (inpatient and outpatient visits) were abstracted at two 
time points (6 months before and after interview). The variable was captured as number of visits in 
the 4-month time period (± 2 months from the 6-month pre/post date). 
 
Plan satisfaction: Participants were asked, “How satisfied are you with your current Medicare 
prescription drug plan?” The responses were on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very 
dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). To be more consistent with the general measures of satisfaction that 
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have been reported in the literature to date, 
25, 57
 responses were collapsed into a dichotomous variable 
in which satisfied included those who answered either somewhat or very satisfied. 
 
Other key independent variables 
 
Medicaid status: This dichotomous variable uses data from both the registry and WebCIS. An 
individual is considered to have Medicaid if either the registry OR WebCIS (upon manual chart 
abstraction) indicates that they receive Medicaid. Any potential participant who received Medicaid is 
dually eligible, and (almost) all of these individuals were randomly auto-assigned to plans.  
 
Previously switched plans: This dichotomous variable was based on participants‟ response to 
whether they had previously switched plans in the past year. For those participants who indicated 
having switched plans, they were also asked: (1) in which month the switch was made; (2) the reason 
for the switch (open-ended). 
 
Control variables 
 
Near poor: This is defined as having an income between 100-250% FPL. This variable is 
taken from the field in WebCIS to indicate whether a participant receives charity care. This variable is 
a dichotomous measure and is counted as yes if the participant was ever enrolled in the charity care 
program as of the chart abstraction date, even if the charity care has expired. This is because the 
incomes for this age group are unlikely to drastically change and we are more interested in 
developing a specific measure to indicate which participants are above the Medicaid threshold but 
still considered near poor. 
 
Comorbidities: ICD-9 codes obtained from the active problem list in WebCIS were used to 
develop calculate the Charlson comorbidity index. This index is based upon the presence or absence 
of 17 comorbid conditions in medical record data, and was developed to predict one-year mortality 
based upon disease severity.
112
 More specifically, I used the Deyo adaptation to the Charlson index, 
which is designed for use with administrative data.
113
 Stata code for the Charlson index was adapted 
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from code written by Vicki Stagg and based upon a SAS coding algorithm published by Quan, et al. 
(2005).
114, 115
 
 
Plan enrollment: We asked participants an open-ended question to ascertain how they chose a 
plan at the start of the benefit. Based on responses to this question, we created a 3-level variable that 
is used in multivariate models as a set of dummy variables: informed choice; random choice; 
insurance agent. These three categories are mutually exclusive and indicate whether participants 
considered any sort of individual medication need when deciding on a plan (informed choice); did not 
take medication need into account (random choice); or had the assistance of an insurance agent when 
enrolling (insurance agent). 
 
Patient characteristics: Standard demographic variables were in the dataset, including: age, 
gender, race and marital status (dichotomized as married or single).  
 
Clinic affiliation: This dichotomous variable represents whether the study participant receives 
care from the Internal Medicine or Family Medicine practices. It was flagged based upon the diabetes 
registry in which the participant was listed. 
 
Plan type: This dichotomous variable denotes whether the participant was enrolled in a PDP 
or MA-PD. Those enrolled in SNPs and MA-PDs were grouped together, given that SNPs are a 
special type of MA-PD with a similar benefit structure.  
 
Extra help: We asked respondents whether they receive extra help paying for their 
medications, which is also known as the low-income subsidy (see Appendix A for question). For 
participants who reported receiving extra help, this option was selected in the PDPF tool, so that these 
subsidies were accurately reflected when estimating their annual costs.  
 
Risk aversion: Some beneficiaries may intentionally choose a more generous, but more 
expensive, Part D benefit in exchange for more comprehensive coverage. To capture this, we asked 
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whether participants generally receive vaccines/immunizations as a measure of risk aversion. This 
question was added to the survey mid-way through data collection.  
 
Benefit type detail: These are a measure of plan generosity assigned by CMS based on the 
benefits offered by a particular PDP or MA-PD. The 4 possible categories, in order from least to most 
generous, are: defined standard benefits (exactly the same as the standard benefit); actuarially 
equivalent (equivalent to defined standard, but with different features); basic alternative benefits 
(generally have smaller deductibles); and enhanced alternative coverage (have additional premiums, 
associated with more generous coverage that is not subsidized by CMS). These 4 variables are used 
together as potential instruments in aims 2 and 3. 
 
Sample size and statistical power 
Sample size estimates were based on: α-level, the number of covariates used in multivariate 
analyses, anticipated effect size, and desired power. This calculation assumed a two-sided 
significance level of α=0.05 and 80% power to detect differences in outcomes. A sample size 
calculation was performed using PASS software to determine the appropriate sample size needed to 
address my study aims.
116
 These are generally divided by whether a linear or logistic regression 
model is used.  
For linear regression models with differential costs as the outcome variable (aim 1b), a 
sample size between 118-172 is required to detect a significant relationship. This variation in sample 
size depends upon the number of regressors used and the effect size. The effect size (f
2
) is analogous 
to the R
2 
value in a multiple regression context. With 10 regressors in the model, 172 participants are 
needed with an R
2
 of 0.1 and 118 participants are needed with an R
2
 value of 0.15.
117, 118
 
For aims (2a) and (3a), a continuous key independent variable (differential costs or total out-
of-pocket costs) is used to predict CRN, a dichotomous variable. For these logistic regressions, a 
sample size of 140 achieves 80% power at a 0.05 significance level to detect an odds ratio of 1.7. This 
also assumes an R
2
 value of 0.1. 
Initial sample size projections estimated that we would have a sample size of approximately 
400 participants. There were 984 potential participants between both registries (588 from General 
Internal Medicine and 396 from Family Medicine). We assumed that 25% of registry members did 
not have Part D and anticipated a 65% response rate based upon convention in other health services 
research surveys.
119
 This gave us a projected sample size of 480 participants, though we anticipated a 
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final sample size around 400 participants after accounting for being unable to reach some patients and 
being unable to collect full Part D information from others. According to a priori power calculations, 
we expected to recruit enough patients to have adequate power to test the hypotheses in aims 1-4. 
 
Statistical analyses 
I have organized this section into two sub-sections, that is, analytical considerations that are 
relevant to more than one aim and those that are related to individual aims.  
 
Analytical considerations across aims 
I will begin by characterizing the sample using descriptive data. I used either t-tests (for 
continuous outcomes) or Pearson chi-square (χ2) tests (for categorical outcomes). In the case of cells 
with low frequencies, a Fisher‟s Exact Test was used instead of the Pearson chi-square test. For 
variables that are not normally-distributed, I used a non-parametric approach (Mann-Whitney test).  
Selection of control variables: Selection of control variables was driven by the conceptual 
model (Figure 5). The specific covariates included in each model are listed by specific aim, below. In 
addition, because site of enrollment (General Medicine versus Family Medicine) can represent 
unmeasured differences in patients, physicians, and organizations, I controlled for site in all analyses. 
Approaches to non-normal data: Differential costs and medication expense were logged for 
use in linear regression models. Use of non-logged cost variables resulted in non-normal and 
heteroskedastic residuals. Log-transformation resulted in a more homoskedastic and normal 
distribution of residuals. Additionally, logging the cost variables allows the interpretation of the 
coefficients as a percent (%) increase or decrease of differential costs, rather than an absolute dollar 
amount, which is more relevant to these analyses.  Cost variables were also rescaled to 1/1000 (in 
USD) for ease of interpretation in regression results. For the two individuals who have a [differential 
costs] value of $0, I set their differential costs equal to $1 so that I could successfully log-transform 
this variable. $1 was chosen rather than a smaller increment, such as $0.01, to be consistent with all 
other cost estimates; the smallest unit to which costs could be estimated using the PDPF tool was to 
the nearest $1. 
Residual plots were also used to diagnose whether observations or combinations of 
independent variables were outliers and therefore causing a model to poorly fit the data. Particularly 
in a small sample, poorly fit observations contradict the main data pattern and therefore pull model 
estimates in a contradictory direction.
120
 As appropriate, outlier observations were omitted from some 
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regression models. This approach was used judiciously, and final analytic sample sizes are reported in 
regression results tables. 
Post-estimation model testing: I used post-estimation diagnostic statistics to examine model 
fit and assumptions. In linear models, I tested model assumptions including: linearity of variable 
relationships; homoskedasticity; and normality of the error term distribution. I conducted White‟s test 
to examine models for heteroskedasticity. Where detected, Huber/White estimators of variance and 
robust standard errors were reported. I plotted the residuals versus predicted values to determine 
whether the error term was normally-distributed. Multicollinearity was assessed in linear models by 
examining the variance inflation factors (VIF) and pairwise correlations.  
 Interpretation of regression coefficients: In cases of logged dependent variables, I needed 
to transform the coefficients in order to interpret them. Based upon the above post-estimation test 
results, all of my results fit the assumptions of a normally-distributed error term and 
homoskedasticity. To interpret the effect of a dummy variable on the log-transformed dependent 
variable, I used the following equation: 
                    
While the Kennedy transformation can also be used in cases of normally-distributed error 
terms and homoskedasticity, I primarly report results from the above equation as it provides almost 
identical results for small standard errors. In the case of higher standard errors (>0.2), results were 
compared to Kennedy-transformed results to ensure similarity. Unless significantly different, results 
using the above transformation are presented, as is more commonly accepted in the literature. 
 Logistic regression coefficients are interpreted as odds ratios, and are reported in tables both 
as coefficients and as odds ratios. 
All statistical analyses were performed using Stata® 11 (StataCorp LP, College Station TX). 
 
Statistical considerations by specific aim 
 
Aim 1: To describe the distributions of beneficiaries being in lowest-cost plans and differential 
costs; and whether dual eligible status affects the probability of being enrolled in a lowest-cost 
plan. 
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Hypothesis: Dual eligibles will have a lower likelihood of being in lowest-cost plans than non-dual 
eligibles.  
Bivariate Analyses: I operationalized my dependent variable in two ways: lowest-cost plan 
enrollment and differential costs, as defined above. For the former, I performed a chi-square test 
comparing duals and non-duals. For the latter, I first conducted a paired t-test. However, because this 
continuous measure is not normally distributed, I also report results from a Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney U) test, a non-parametric approach.  
I calculate the prevalence of being in a lowest-cost plan at multiple thresholds, that is, 
whether the participant is in a plan that is within 10%, 15%, or 20% of the cost of a lowest-cost plan. 
This is necessary because it is possible that some plans may not be lowest-cost by a nominal amount, 
in some cases even due to participant choice (about desired plan features that may incur a higher 
cost). However, a percentage threshold around this estimate allows for appropriate flexibility while 
still capturing the essence of the lowest-cost plan variable. I estimated descriptive statistics and 
regression models using costs within these three different percentage cushions around the lowest-cost 
plan and compared results. Ultimately, however, the final results presented will use this variable to 
indicate that a beneficiary is in a plan with costs within 10% of the annual out-of-pocket costs in a 
lowest-cost plan.  
Multivariate Analyses: Using multivariate regression, my primary analyses examine the 
dichotomous variable of whether a participant is in a lowest-cost plan based upon Medicaid status. 
 
                                                                
Where M is a logit function and; 
[Z] is a vector of covariates including: age; near poor; male; race; married; clinic affiliation; 
plan type; comorbidities; medication expense; informed choice; insurance agent 
 
Secondarily, I examined this hypothesis using [differential costs], rather than [lowest-cost 
plan enrollment] as the outcome variable of interest. The null hypothesis is that duals have lower 
differential costs that non-duals. 
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[Z] is a vector of covariates including: age; near poor; male; race; married; clinic affiliation; 
plan type; comorbidities; medication expense; informed choice; insurance agent 
 
Aim 2. To determine the association between lowest-cost plan enrollment/differential costs and 
CRN, as well as between CRN and clinical outcomes and health services utilization. 
Hypotheses: 
2a. Beneficiaries in lowest-cost plans will have a lower likelihood of experiencing CRN than 
those not in lowest-cost plans. 
2b. Beneficiaries with lower differential costs will have a lower likelihood of experiencing 
CRN than those with higher differential costs. 
2c. Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have worse clinical outcomes related to their 
diabetes than those who did not experience CRN. 
2d. Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have higher health services utilization than 
those who did not experience CRN.  
 
The pathway that I am trying to estimate is: 
Figure 8: Analysis pathway (Aim 2) 
 
 
There are two ways to conceptualize this aim and the relationship between the variables: (1) 
consider both equations together using a two-stage instrumental variables (IV) approach and (2) 
estimate the equations separately without using an IV approach. I attempted both strategies. The 
primary advantage of the IV approach is the ability to account for potential endogeneity when 
estimating the relationship between [CRN] and [clinical outcome]. However, this requires identifying 
a valid instrument, which presents a challenge given the limited number of variables in my dataset. I 
tested the strength of multiple potential instruments, as discussed below. The latter approach may be 
differential costs 1
cost-related 
nonadherence
2
outcome (clinical 
or utilization)
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more intuitive in its interpretation (particularly for a clinically-minded audience); however, without 
controlling for potential endogeneity, the parameter estimates run the risk of being biased. 
 
IV approach 
Using the IV approach, we approach this pathway (Figure 8) as one „causal‟ chain. By doing 
so, we need to acknowledge the potentially endogenous [CRN] variable and correct for it; otherwise, 
we could not estimate the true effect of [differential costs] on [outcome]. In the IV approach, 
[differential costs], [plan type], and [benefit type detail] act as the instruments because they 
theoretically only impact patient outcome (clinical or utilization) via their impact on CRN. Plan type 
and benefit type detail can also act as instruments because they are excluded from the second-stage. It 
is possible that PDPs may have a different cost structure as compared to MA-PDs and that generosity 
levels may vary to affect CRN, but not [outcome] directly. In the first-stage equation, I will examine 
whether the IVs have sufficient explanatory power and variation to be used in place of the potentially 
endogenous [CRN] variable. 
In the IV approach, there are two criteria for a good instrument:  
(1) instruments [differential costs, plan type, benefit type detail] are correlated with [CRN]; and  
(2) instruments are only correlated with [outcome] via their impact on [CRN].  
Specification tests will be used to determine whether these conditions were met, to determine 
the feasibility of the IV approach. When not large enough, predicted measure will be noisy. In the 
first-stage equation, I will examine whether the instruments had sufficient explanatory power and 
variation to be used in place of the potentially endogenous [CRN] variable. This will be done by 
evaluating the joint F-statistic (or χ2 for a non-linear function) on the instruments—which 
conventionally should F-statistic have at least a magnitude of 10—and the R2/pseudo-R2 of the 
regression—which conventionally should have a magnitude of at least 0.2 to 0.3. 
If the results of these specification tests suggests that the IV approach is not feasible, my 
primary analysis will focus on the separate estimation the relationship between [differential costs] and 
[CRN]; and between [CRN] and [outcome]. 
 
Non-IV Approach 
If we fail to identify a valid instrument(s), the models will be estimated separately. 
Differential costs will then be considered exogenous; this seems appropriate, as they are only the 
51 
 
excess costs paid for medications and are not indicative of medication expense itself (which could be 
jointly determined with outcome). In addition, we were interested in the coefficient estimate on 
[differential costs] due to its policy significance. We would then minimize endogeneity by including 
all available and appropriate covariates (defined by the conceptual model).  
There may be insufficient statistical power to examine clinical outcomes using multivariate 
regression, depending upon the number of participants who have clinical lab value in both the pre and 
post periods. If many have missing values in either one of these periods, they will fall out of 
regression analyses when the difference is used as the dependent variable. However, I also use the 
single-item self-rated health status question as a general outcome measure, which will likely have 
more observations and may therefore be more able to detect a relationship than a clinical lab value 
specific to one disease. 
For the clinical lab values used in aim (2c), I will perform paired t-tests to explore any 
potential relationships between [CRN] and [outcome]. These results can suggest whether an 
association may be present, but that may be undetectable using regression analyses. Each model will 
be run twice: once with [differential costs]”as written” and once with [differential costs]”generic”. 
 
Aim 3: To determine the association between total out-of-pocket costs and CRN, as well as 
between CRN and clinical outcomes and health services utilization. 
 
Figure 9: Analysis pathway (Aim 3) 
 
 
Hypotheses: 
3a. Beneficiaries with lower total out-of-pocket costs will have a lower likelihood of 
experiencing CRN than those with higher total out-of-pocket costs. 
3b. Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have worse clinical outcomes related to their 
diabetes than those who did not experience CRN. 
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3c. Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have higher health services utilization than those 
who did not experience CRN.  
 
The analytic approach for aim 3 mirrors that of aim 2, but with total out-of-pocket costs, 
rather than differential costs, as the key independent variable in the first-stage equation. Hypotheses 
(3b) and (3c) are the same hypotheses (2c) and (2d). I again explored an IV approach, both with and 
without the addition of [benefit type detail] and [plan type] as the instruments (in addition to [total 
out-of-pocket costs]).  The same specification tests will be used as in aim (2), and if the results of 
these specification tests suggests that the IV approach is not feasible, my primary analysis will focus 
on estimating the models separately. 
 
Aim 4: To determine the association between switching plans and differential costs, plan 
satisfaction, and CRN. 
Aim 4 estimates the relationship between previously switching plans and current plan 
attributes. In the survey, we asked about previous plan switching and current plan satisfaction, so the 
hypotheses reflect this time order. The statistical approach includes estimating OLS and logistic 
regression models, depending upon how the dependent variable is operationalized. Given that all 
variables are collected from survey data and/or participant characteristics, all analyses are cross-
sectional. 
 
Hypotheses: 
4a. Beneficiaries who switched plans will have lower differential costs (and will have a 
higher likelihood of being in a lowest-cost plan) than those who did not switch plans. 
 
                                                                     
[Z] includes: age; male; race; Medicaid; near poor; married; clinic affiliation; plan type; 
comorbidities; medication expense; informed choice; insurance agent 
 
Differential costs were log-transformed given their non-normal distribution, and models were 
estimated for “as written” and generic differential costs. The continuous [differential costs] variable 
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was replaced with the dichotomous [lowest-cost plan enrollment] variable for a secondary analysis, 
and a logit function was estimated. 
 
4b. Beneficiaries who switched plans will have a higher likelihood of being satisfied with 
their current plan than those who did not switch plans.  
 
                                                                       
Where M is a logit function and; 
[Z] is a vector of covariates including: age; male; race; Medicaid; near poor; married; clinic 
affiliation; plan type; comorbidities; medication expense; informed choice; insurance agent 
 
4c. Beneficiaries who switched plans will have a lower likelihood of experiencing CRN than 
those who did not switch plans. 
 
                                                         
Where M is a logit function and; 
[Z] is a vector of covariates including: age; male; race; Medicaid; near poor; married; clinic 
affiliation; plan type; comorbidities; medication expense; informed choice; insurance agent 
 
  
CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 
Study participants 
We identified 983 individuals in the General Internal Medicine and Family Medicine diabetes 
registries who were 65 years or older. We made 3,417 phone calls to these potential participants to 
assess their eligibility and willingness to participate. We were unable to contact 284 persons, 285 
were ineligible, and 203 declined to participate (Figure 10). The remaining 231 completed the 
telephone survey; 66 participants failed to return signed HIPAA consent after multiple contacts. 
Because these forms were required to access their medical record, the full sample size reduced to 165.  
 
Figure 10: Recruitment 
 
 
Characteristics of the participants are provided in Table 2. Demographically, the sample was 
predominately female (61.9%), white (53.0%), and married (57.3%), with a mean age of 73.4 years 
old. Almost half the sample were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans (45.1%). Nearly 20% of the 
sample were dually-eligible for Medicare and Medicaid, and an additional 30.9% were classified as 
INELIGIBLE (285)
No Part D (210)
Can’t do phone interview (37)
Other (38)
Assessed for eligibility (983)
Internal Medicine (587)
Family Medicine (396)
Study participants: 
SURVEY DATA
(231)
Study participants:
FULL DATA
(165)
REFUSED (203)
Refused (171)
Opted out before contact (32)
Unable to 
contact
(264)
Did not give
HIPAA consent
(66)
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near poor (incomes between 100-250% FPL). The sample is sicker than the average elderly 
population. Over half of respondents report that they are in fair or poor health (53.2%). Participants 
were prescribed an average of 9.2 Part D medications (maximum of 21 prescriptions). The average 
total out-of-pocket costs (in a beneficiary‟s current plan) were substantial: $4417 ± 2804 (“as 
written”) and $3042 ± 2206 (“generic”).  
The most prevalent comorbidities include: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (30.1%), 
congestive heart failure (25.9%), and depression (18.1%). Despite their poor self-reported health and 
number of medications, clinical characteristics suggest that the study sample is well-managed: mean 
HbA1c = 7.0%, with only 17.2% having an average HbA1c value > 8.0%. The mean systolic and 
diastolic blood pressures were 138.0 mmHg and 70.7 mmHg, respectively. The mean total and LDL 
cholesterol were 174.8 and 88.1, respectively. Participants used health services extensively: a mean of 
20.9 UNC outpatient clinic visits (range of 1 to 124) and 33.3% of the sample had an inpatient stay 
during the 12-month study window. Four study participants died during the study period. 
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Table 2: Study sample characteristics  
 
 
Demographics % 
Age (mean ± SD)2 73.5 (± 5.6)
Male1 38.1
Nonwhite2 47.0
Medicaid1 18.2
Near poor (100-250% FPL)2 30.9
Married2 56.6
From Family Medicine1 30.3
In Medicare Advantage plan2 45.1
Charlson  index (mean ± SD)2 1.2 (± 0.9)
Survey data1 %
Experienced cost-related nonadherence 32.9
Informed plan enrollment choice 38.7
Insurance agent enrollment assistance 17.0
Satisfied with plan 73.0
Switched plans (past year) 23.0
Has extra help (low-income subsidy) 8.2
Healthy (excellent, very good, good) 46.8
Receives immunizations 90.8
Utilization data2 Median Mean SD
Had an inpatient stay (1 year) 33.3%
Outpatient visits (1 year) 17.0 20.9 17.1
Clinical data2 Median Mean SD
Prescribed number of medications 9.0 9.2 3.5
HbA1c 6.7 7.0 1.0
Blood pressure
Systolic 136.0 138 15.5
Diastolic 70.7 70.7 8.5
Lipids
Total cholesterol 166.0 174.8 44.6
Triglycerides 123.0 143.2 82.6
HDL 50.0 52.2 16.5
LDL 82.3 88.1 31.3
Prevalence of select comorbidities %
Diabetes with chronic complications 45.8
COPD 30.1
Congestive heart failure 25.9
Depression 18.1
Peripheral vascular disease 13.3
Myocardial infarction 10.8
1= Obtained from survey data  (n=231)
2= Obtained from medica l  record data  (n=165)
Study Sample Characteristics
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Approximately 1/3 of the sample experienced self-reported cost-related nonadherence 
(32.9%), which is higher than other published prevalence estimates among Part D beneficiaries.
14, 86
 
The vast majority of participants were satisfied with their current Part D plan (73.0%), and 23.0% had 
switched plans in the past year, which is higher than published rates.
14
 Additionally, over 90% of 
respondents answered that they do receive immunizations and vaccines. Given the small degree of 
variation and that it was only collected for a proportion of the sample, it will not be used as a measure 
of risk aversion in regression analyses. Participants‟ responses to an open-ended question about how 
they chose a plan upon enrollment are presented in Table 3. Half of the sample had some assistance in 
choosing a part D plan: 32.3% has help from a physician, pharmacist, family member, or friend. The 
other 17.5% had assistance from an insurance agent, while only 3.9% used Medicare resources to 
assist them with enrollment. 
 
Table 3: When you first enrolled into Medicare Part D, how did you choose a plan? 
 
 
Standardizing cost estimates to 2009 
Data on out-of-pockets costs spanned parts of three years. Because benefits within plans may 
change each year and some of the plans available may change each year, we needed to standardize 
cost estimates across time. I standardized cost estimates empirically. Specifically, I conducted a 
separate study of 33 participants in the SeniorPharmAssist program, a program to assist seniors who 
require help with medications. Half of the sample had the low-income subsidy (at varying levels from 
25% to 100%), while the other half did not. Using this information, I entered the same prescription 
medications in the CMS plan finder tool in 2008 an 2009. The median increase between 2008 an 2009 
was $768 (29.13%) for those with LIS an $401 (66.79%) for those with LIS. Thus, out-of-pocket 
costs in 2008 were inflated by these percents. Because there were no data available to conduct 
% n
Used Medicare resources 3.9% 9
Systematic,  non-specific strategy 11.3% 26
Had help- from agent 17.0% 39
Had help- not from agent 23.5% 54
Random selection 6.5% 15
Plan loyalty/Brand recognition 9.6% 22
Chose same plan as spouse 1.7% 4
Auto-enrolled 11.7% 27
Don't know/don't remember 14.8% 34
100.0% 230
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separate analyses for 2010 data, I used the same adjustment factor to standardize costs to 2009 for the 
4 participants with data in 2010. The LIS results may be a slight overestimate because there were 
some LIS individuals for whom the plan choices were outside the set of NC plans that were at/below 
benchmark status. Therefore, the cost to stay in the plan (that lost benchmark status) would be much 
greater than the costs if they switched to a new (LIS-approved) plan. There were two companies for 
which their cost data were not in the PDPF tool. For participants having these two plans (n=8), I 
manually calculated actual cost estimates using their formularies and plan benefit details (available 
from company websites). Lowest-cost plan estimates were still available in the PDPF tool in the same 
manner in which they were calculated for all other participants. 
 As described in the methods section, we planned a priori to examine differences by site of 
care (Family Medicine vs. Internal medicine), and whether or not participants returned HIPAA forms. 
In both comparisons, groups were similar regarding demographic characteristics, site of care, CRN, 
self-rated health status, plan switching and using help to choose a plan (results not shown).  
 
Results by specific aim 
 
Aim 1.  
To describe the distributions of beneficiaries being in lowest-cost plans and differential costs; 
and whether dual eligible status affects the probability of being enrolled in a lowest-cost plan.
  
Regardless of assumptions about generic substitutions, only one-quarter of the sample is 
enrolled in a lowest-cost plan, defined as having out-of-pocket costs within 10% of a lowest-cost 
plan. Specifically, assuming prescriptions are filled as written, 25.5% of the sample is in a lowest-cost 
plan. Assuming generic substitutions, 24.9% of the sample is in a lowest-cost plan. Analyses around 
the 10% estimate indicate that this is an appropriate cut-off level. Sensitivity analyses found that 
using 15% or 20% as the threshold makes very little difference in the estimate ( 
Table 4). Regression results did not significantly change when the 15% or 20% thresholds 
were used instead.  
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Table 4: Various estimates for lowest-cost plan enrollment 
 
 
Not only are most patients not in a lowest-cost plan, but the additional amount they would 
have to pay out-of-pocket is substantial. On average, participants are paying 30% more than 
necessary to obtain medications. The median differential costs suggest that more than half of 
participants are in plans that requires out-of-pocket costs at least $715 (“as written”) / $489 
(“generic”) more than the lowest-cost plan (Table 5). Moreover, the person with the highest 
differential cost would pay $7729 (“as written”) or $7288 (“generic”) more than in a lowest-cost plan. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive cost data 
 
 
% threshold 
around estimate
Substitution 
assumption
% of sample in 
lowest-cost plan
"as written" 4.2
"generic" 6.1
"as written" 25.5
"generic" 24.9
"as written" 33.3
"generic" 36.4
"as written" 39.4
"generic" 40.6
0
10
15
20
Cost data (n=165) %
In lowest-cost plan ("as written") 4.2
In lowest-cost plan ("generic") 6.1
Within 10% of LC plan ("as written") 25.5
Within 10% of LC plan ("generic") 24.9
Within 15% of LC plan ("as written") 33.3
Within 15% of LC plan ("generic") 36.4
Within 20% of LC plan ("as written") 39.4
Within 20% of LC plan ("generic") 40.6
Median Mean SD
Differential costs ("as written") $715 $1,215 $1,567
Differential costs ("generic") $489 $692 $875
Total out-of-pocket costs ("as written") $4,535 $4,417 $2,804
Total out-of-pocket costs ("generic") $2,888 $3,042 $2,206
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- 
Primary hypothesis (lowest-cost plan enrollment): Dual eligibles will have a lower likelihood of 
being in lowest-cost plans than non-dual eligibles. 
Bivariate analyses: Dual status was not associated with being in a lowest-cost plan, 
assuming either “as written” (χ2=0.57) or “generic” (χ2=1.31) medications. Thus, this hypothesis was 
not supported. I also examined the bivariate association between income level and lowest-cost plan 
enrollment (Figure 11) and found no significant difference in low-cost plan enrollment (p=0.32 
(“generic”); p=0.13 (“as written”)). 
 
Figure 11: Percent in lowest-cost plan by income level 
 
 
Individuals with Medicaid had a significantly different distribution of medication expenses 
than those without Medicaid), regardless of whether we considered generic substitutions. The 
medication expenses were significantly higher overall for those without Medicaid (Figure 12).  
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Figure 12: Distribution of medication expense by Medicaid status (“generic” & “as written”) 
 
 
 
In the multivariate models (both “as written” and “generic”), higher medication expense were 
associated with a greater likelihood of being in a lowest-cost plan. The direction of the multivariate 
relationship is in the same direction as the association in the bivariate relationship (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Distribution of medication expense by lowest-cost plan enrollment (“generic” & “as 
written”) 
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Multivariate analyses (Table 6): For both “as written” and “generic” costs, there is no 
significant association between dual status and being in a lowest-cost plan. In the “as written” model 
only, being near poor is associated with a 68% decrease in the odds of being in a lowest-cost plan 
(OR=0.32; p<0.05). In both the “generic” and “as written” models, higher medication expense is 
significantly associated with a higher likelihood of being in a lowest-cost plan (p<0.001). Holding all 
else constant, there will be an 161% (“generic”)/67% (“as written”) increase in the odds of being in of 
a lowest-cost plan for a $1000 increase in medication expense (p<0.001). In the “generic” model 
only, a one-unit increase in the Charlson index comorbitiy score is associated with a 66% decrease in 
the odds of being in a lowest-cost plan (p<0.01), and a one year increase in age is associated with a 
12% decrease in the odds of being in a lowest-cost plan (p<0.01).  
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Table 6: Logistic regression results for Aim 1: The effect of Medicaid on lowest-cost plan enrollment 
 “Generic” OR “Generic” Coeff “As written” OR “As written” Coeff 
     
Has Medicaid 1.38 0.32 1.60 0.47 
 (1.14) (0.83) (1.14) (0.71) 
     
Near poor 0.71 -0.35 0.32* -1.13* 
 (0.39) (0.55) (0.16) (0.51) 
     
Age 0.88** -0.13** 0.98 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
Male 1.64 0.49 1.71 0.54 
 (0.84) (0.51) (0.77) (0.45) 
     
Nonwhite 2.33 0.85 1.11 0.10 
 (1.20) (0.52) (0.50) (0.45) 
     
Single 1.02 0.02 0.59 -0.52 
 (0.53) (0.52) (0.27) (0.45) 
     
In Medicare Advantage 1.06 0.06 1.37 0.31 
 (0.55) (0.52) (0.60) (0.44) 
     
Charlson index 0.34** -1.09** 1.02 0.02 
 (0.12) (0.37) (0.26) (0.26) 
     
Informed choice 0.51 -0.68 0.90 -0.11 
 (0.28) (0.56) (0.44) (0.49) 
     
Insurance agent 0.26+ -1.34+ 1.32 0.28 
 (0.21) (0.79) (0.77) (0.58) 
     
Family Med Clinic 0.31+ -1.17+ 1.27 0.24 
 (0.19) (0.60) (0.57) (0.45) 
     
Medication expense  2.61*** 0.96***   
(Generic) (0.50) (0.19)   
     
Medication expense    1.67*** 0.51*** 
(As written)   (0.19) (0.12) 
     
Constant 806.34+ 6.69+ 0.18 -1.70 
 
 
(2916.49) (3.62) (0.53) (2.90) 
Observations 160 160 163 163 
Pseudo R
2
 0.336 0.336 0.182 0.182 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Secondary hypothesis (differential costs): Dual eligibles will have lower differential costs than non-
dual eligibles. 
Bivariate analyses: In the Wilcoxon rank-sum test analyses, the distributions of differential 
costs are different for duals and non-duals (Figure 14). This difference was statistically significant for 
“generic” and “as written” medication costs (“generic:” z=2.46; p<0.01; “as written:” z=-1.95; 
p<0.10). Of note, the difference was in opposite directions: for “as written” costs, having Medicaid is 
associated with higher differential costs, whereas for “generic” costs, having Medicaid is associated 
with lower differential costs (Figure 14). ANOVA results indicate that “as written” differential costs 
decrease with increasing income levels (F=6.03; p<0.01). And, “as written” differential costs are 
higher than “generic” differential costs across income categories, as expected (Figure 15). 
 
Figure 14: Distribution of differential costs expense by Medicaid status (“generic” & “as written”) 
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Figure 15: Differential costs by income level 
 
 
Multivariate analyses (Table 7): This model was run only for people who had any 
differential costs. That is, I omitted the 7 (“as written”)/12 (“generic”) participants with differential 
costs < $10/year because they were poorly fit by the linear model and identified as outliers on the 
residuals plot. In the “as written” model only, having Medicaid was associated with an 84.1% 
increase in differential costs (p<0.10). The Kennedy transformation was used to interpret this 
coefficient, because the standard error is above 0.2 (0.36). 
In both models, being near poor is significantly associated with a 49.5% (p<0.05) and 95.6% 
(p<0.01) increase in differential costs for “generic” and “as written” costs, respectively. Being in a 
Medicare Advantage plan, rather than a PDP, is also associated with a 27.2% (p<0.10) and 50.2% 
(p<0.01) decrease in differential costs, respectively, for “generic” and “as written” medications. 
Lastly, in the “generic” model only, being from Family Medicine is associated with a 68.3% increase 
in differential costs relative to being from General Internal Medicine (p<0.01).  
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Table 7: OLS regression results for Aim 1: The effect of Medicaid on differential costs 
 “Generic” Coeff “As written” Coeff 
 
Has Medicaid 
 
-0.23 
 
0.67+ 
 (0.27) (0.36) 
   
Near poor 0.40* 0.70** 
 (0.20) (0.25) 
   
Age 0.02 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   
Male -0.22 -0.31 
 (0.18) (0.23) 
   
Nonwhite -0.15 -0.29 
 (0.18) (0.22) 
   
Single -0.26 0.18 
 (0.19) (0.23) 
   
In Medicare Advantage -0.32+ -0.70** 
 (0.19) (0.22) 
   
Charlson index 0.00 -0.10 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
   
Informed choice 0.24 0.24 
 (0.19) (0.24) 
   
Insurance agent -0.08 -0.27 
 (0.27) (0.32) 
   
Family Med Clinic 0.52** 0.16 
 (0.19) (0.24) 
   
Log medication expense 0.01  
(Generic) (0.05)  
   
Log medication expense  -0.06 
(As written)  (0.11) 
   
Constant -2.39* -0.36 
 
 
(1.19) (1.46) 
Observations 151 155 
R
2
 0.177 0.222 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Aim 2. 
To determine the association between lowest-cost plan enrollment/differential costs and CRN, 
as well as between CRN and clinical outcomes and health services utilization. 
 
Model specifications: In all model specifications, the potential instruments failed. 
[Differential costs] (both “as written” and “generic”) and [plan type] were tried as instruments, both 
with and without the addition of [benefit type detail]. In each case, the test for joint significance of 
these potential instruments was not significant. The χ2 test statistics are 2.23 (“as written”) and 2.57 
(“generic”) when benefit type is not used. The χ2 test statistics are 2.25 (“as written”) and 3.65 
(“generic”) when benefit type is added as a potential instrument. None of these test statistics are 
greater than the conventionally-accepted magnitude of 10 and do not reach significance at the 
conventional α=0.05 level.  
The pseudo-R
2 
values for these four models ranged from 0.09 to 0.1. These values are less 
than the 0.2-0.3 that is generally accepted as high enough to proceed with a two-stage approach.
121
 
According to Bollen et al. (1995), The R
2 
should be at least 0.1 with a large sample, since the actual 
measure of CRN would be replaced with the predicted value from the first-step equation.
122
 If the 
R
2
/pseudo-R
2
 isn‟t large enough, this predicted measure will be noisy. My relatively-small sample is 
also a consideration in determining whether an IV approach is biased back towards estimating the 
simple model.  
[Differential costs], [plan type], and [benefit type detail]) do not have good predictive power. 
If the first stage does not have good predictive power, those predicted values of [CRN] will become a 
poor proxy in the second stage.
122
 This holds whether we use the predicted values of [CRN] in the 
second stage (2SLS) or add the residuals derived from predicted [CRN] values to the second stage 
(2SRI).
123
 Because I lacked good instruments, it is unnecessary to perform additional specification 
tests with the second stage equation (e.g., Hausman test to determine whether additional instruments 
are validly excluded from the main equation; t-test on the 1
st
 stage error term to test exogeneity of 
[CRN]). 
Even if endogeneity is a problem, the two-step estimation method may not be preferable for 
three reasons: (1) the R
2
 of the first-stage equation is low; (2) the sample size is small; and (3) the 
degree of identification is low.
122
  
My pseudo-R
2
 values are not above the generally-accepted 0.2-0.3 level that is preferable 
when the two steps do not have a high degree of identification. 
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My sample sizes for the equations using clinical data range from 20 to 111, which is 
generally considered too small of a sample for use in an IV approach. 
There is not a high degree of identification, given that most of the covariates overlap and are 
used in both the first and second stage equations. According to Bollen et al. (1995), if the variable 
overlap is 75% or more (which it is in the instance, with only 2-3 variables unique to the first stage), 
the IV approach almost always fails and it is more appropriate to estimate the simple model.
122
 
When the potential instruments are weakly correlated with CRN, the IV approach is not 
desirable even if the sample is large.
124
 Given that I have invalid instruments, the two-stage results 
would be biased towards estimating the simple models. Therefore, it is more appropriate to estimate 
the structural equation of the relationship between CRN and outcome (Eq. 2) and hypothesize the 
direction of any potential biases related to omitted variables. Given the limitations of my available 
potential instruments, I use a non-IV approach as set forth in the Methods section to estimate Aim 2. 
 
Hypotheses: 
Aim 2a: Beneficiaries in lowest-cost plans will have a lower likelihood of experiencing CRN than 
those not in lowest-cost plans. 
Bivariate analyses: For both “generic” and “as written” medication costs, there is a 
significant bivariate association between being in a lowest-cost plan and experiencing CRN for both 
“generic” (χ2=7.85; p<0.01) and “as written” (χ2=3.59; p=0.06) medications. However, this 
relationship is in the unexpected direction: beneficiaries in lowest-cost plans are more likely to 
experience CRN. We explored medication expense as one potential explanation for this unexpected 
relationship, and did not find that the prevalence of CRN relative to being in a lowest-cost plan 
differed significantly across quartiles of medication expense for either “generic” (Figure 16) or “as 
written” (Figure 17) costs. 
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Figure 16: Percentage with CRN by quartiles of medication expense (“generic”) 
 
 
Figure 17: Percentage with CRN by quartiles of medication expense (“as written”) 
 
 
I also examined the prevalence of CRN as a function of income category, and while it appears 
as if those near poor (middle income category experience higher rates of CRN, this difference is not 
significant (Figure 18). An ANOVA test determined that there was no significant difference of the 
prevalence of CRN across income categories. 
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Figure 18: Percentage with CRN by income level 
 
Multivariate analyses: In both logistic regression models, being in a lowest-cost plan is 
associated with a higher likelihood of experiencing CRN. In the “generic” model, holding all else 
constant, there will be a 265% increase in the odds of experiencing CRN if a beneficiary is in a 
lowest-cost plan (OR=3.65; p<0.01). In the “as written” model, the relationship approaches 
significance at α=0.10 with an odds ratio of 2.15. This relationship is in an unexpected direction.  
In the “as written” model only, I observed an 83% decrease in the odds of experiencing CRN 
for beneficiaries who have Medicaid, relative to those who do not (p<0.05). Having help from an 
agent also approaches significance only in the “generic” model, which is associated with a 146% 
increase in the odds of experiencing CRN (OR=2.46; p<0.15) (Table 8). 
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Table 8: Logistic regression results for Aim 2a: The effect of lowest-cost plan enrollment on CRN 
 “Generic” OR “Generic” Coeff “As written” OR “As written” Coeff 
     
In low-cost plan 3.65** 1.30**   
(Generic) (1.73) (0.47)   
     
In low-cost plan   2.15+ 0.76+ 
(As written)   (0.96) (0.45) 
     
Has Medicaid 0.36 -1.03 0.17* -1.79* 
 (0.24) (0.68) (0.14) (0.85) 
     
Near poor 1.38 0.32 1.36 0.31 
 (0.59) (0.42) (0.57) (0.42) 
     
Age 0.95 -0.05 0.95 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
     
Male 0.84 -0.18 0.88 -0.13 
 (0.34) (0.40) (0.35) (0.40) 
     
Nonwhite 0.93 -0.07 1.05 0.05 
 (0.37) (0.40) (0.41) (0.39) 
     
Single 0.86 -0.15 0.86 -0.15 
 (0.35) (0.40) (0.35) (0.40) 
     
In Medicare Advantage 1.42 0.35 1.19 0.17 
 (0.56) (0.40) (0.47) (0.39) 
     
Charlson index 1.31 0.27 1.14 0.13 
 (0.31) (0.24) (0.26) (0.23) 
     
Informed choice 0.86 -0.15 0.96 -0.04 
 (0.37) (0.43) (0.40) (0.42) 
     
Insurance agent 2.46+ 0.90+ 2.28 0.82 
 (1.30) (0.53) (1.20) (0.53) 
     
Family Med Clinic 1.22 0.20 0.94 -0.06 
 (0.50) (0.41) (0.38) (0.40) 
     
Medication expense 0.89 -0.11   
(Generic) (0.11) (0.12)   
     
Medication expense   0.96 -0.04 
(As written)   (0.10) (0.10) 
     
Constant 12.20 2.50 11.31 2.43 
 
 
(34.39) (2.82) (31.07) (2.75) 
Observations 162 162 161 161 
Pseudo R
2
 0.122 0.122 0.112 0.112 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Aim 2b: Beneficiaries with lower differential costs will have a lower likelihood of experiencing CRN 
than those with higher differential costs.  
Bivariate analyses: When examining differential costs by quartiles and their association with 
lowest-cost plan enrollment and CRN, we observe that individuals in lowest-cost plans experience 
higher rates of CRN across the first three quartiles of differential costs (there were no participants in 
lowest-cost plans in the 4
th
 quartile of differential costs (Figure 19). This may indicate that there is not 
one particular threshold of spending (as indicated by differential costs) at which beneficiaries are 
particularly susceptible to CRN.  
 
Figure 19: Percentage with CRN by quartiles of differential costs (“generic” & “as written”) 
 
 
Multivariate analyses: Differential costs are significantly associated with CRN in the “as 
written” model only. There is a 36% increase in the odds of experiencing CRN associated with a 
$1000 increase in differential costs (p<0.05). The only significant covariate in the “as written” model 
is Medicaid, which also approaches significance in the “generic” model. Having Medicaid is 
significantly associated with a 77-90% decrease in the likelihood of experiencing CRN relative to 
participants who do not have Medicaid (OR=0.10; p<0.05 (“as written”)/OR=0.23; p<0.10 
(“generic”)). In the “as written” model, participants who had assistance enrolling into their plan from 
an insurance agent have higher odds of experiencing CRN (OR=2.51; p<0.10) (Table 9). There are no 
additional significant covariates in the “generic” model.  
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Table 9: Logistic regression results for Aim 2b: The effect of differential costs on CRN 
 “Generic” OR “Generic” Coeff “As written” OR “As written” Coeff 
     
Differential costs 0.76 -0.27   
(Generic) (0.23) (0.30)   
     
Differential costs   1.36* 0.31* 
(As written)   (0.18) (0.13) 
     
Has Medicaid 0.23+ -1.45+ 0.10* -2.30* 
 (0.19) (0.83) (0.09) (0.94) 
     
Near poor 1.29 0.26 1.07 0.07 
 (0.56) (0.43) (0.46) (0.42) 
     
Age 0.95 -0.05 0.97 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
Male 0.95 -0.06 0.81 -0.21 
 (0.39) (0.41) (0.34) (0.42) 
     
Nonwhite 1.18 0.17 1.23 0.20 
 (0.48) (0.40) (0.49) (0.40) 
     
Single 0.72 -0.32 0.88 -0.12 
 (0.30) (0.42) (0.37) (0.42) 
     
In Medicare Advantage 1.18 0.17 1.95 0.67 
 (0.49) (0.41) (0.82) (0.42) 
     
Charlson index 1.35 0.30 1.15 0.14 
 (0.33) (0.24) (0.27) (0.23) 
     
Informed choice 1.09 0.09 0.99 -0.01 
 (0.47) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) 
     
Insurance agent 2.28 0.82 2.51+ 0.92+ 
 (1.25) (0.55) (1.37) (0.54) 
     
Family Med Clinic 1.12 0.11 0.87 -0.14 
 (0.48) (0.43) (0.38) (0.43) 
     
Medication expense 1.06 0.05   
(Generic) (0.11) (0.11)   
     
Medication expense   0.99 -0.01 
(As written)   (0.10) (0.10) 
     
Constant 9.62 2.26 1.97 0.68 
 (27.15) (2.82) (5.56) (2.82) 
 
Observations 151 151 156 156 
Pseudo R
2
 0.105 0.105 0.128 0.128 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Aim 2c: Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have worse clinical outcomes related to their 
diabetes than those who did not experience CRN. 
Self-reported health status (Table 10): CRN is negatively associated with self-reported 
health status, both in bivariate and multivariate analyses. Experiencing CRN is associated with a 69% 
decrease in the odds of the participant being in good health (OR=0.31; p<0.01). Additionally, we see 
a 28% decrease in the odds of being in good health for every $1000 increase in medication expense 
(OR=0.72; p<0.01). As comorbidity score increases (sicker participants), the likelihood of being in 
good health decreases (OR=0.64; p,0.05). 
 
Table 10: Logistic regression results for Aim 2c: The effect of CRN on general health status 
 OR Coeff 
   
CRN 0.31** -1.16** 
 (0.13) (0.41) 
   
Has Medicaid 1.14 0.13 
 (0.63) (0.56) 
   
Near poor 0.83 -0.18 
 (0.38) (0.45) 
   
Age 0.95 -0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
   
Male 1.39 0.33 
 (0.55) (0.39) 
   
Nonwhite 0.69 -0.38 
 (0.27) (0.39) 
   
Single 1.55 0.44 
 (0.63) (0.41) 
   
Charlson index 0.64* -0.45* 
 (0.14) (0.23) 
   
Family Med Clinic 1.50 0.41 
 (0.60) (0.40) 
   
Medication expense 0.72** -0.33** 
(Generic) (0.08) (0.11) 
   
Constant 198.59+ 5.29+ 
 (545.59) (2.75) 
 
Observations 157 157 
Pseudo R
2
 0.166 0.166 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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HbA1c (Table 11):In the OLS model, CRN is not significantly associated with HbA1c and 
there are no significant covariates in the model. Age approaches significance at the α=0.10 level, with 
older age being associated with a slightly lower HbA1c value in the post period. However, the 
bivariate association between CRN and the difference in HbA1c value between pre and post period 
approaches significance at the α=0.10 level (t=1.94; p=0.06). However, the relationship is in the 
unexpected direction: individuals experiencing CRN have lower scores in the post period than the pre 
period, while individuals without CRN have higher scores in the post period than they did in the pre 
period.  
Blood pressure (Table 11): CRN is associated with a 7.37 unit (SE=4.03) drop in systolic 
BP from pre to post period (p<0.10). Experiencing CRN is significantly associated with a 4.45 unit 
(SE=1.79) drop in diastolic BP from pre to post period (p<0.05). In the systolic model, being male is 
associated with a 7.78 unit (SE=3.89) increase in BP from pre to post period (p<0.05). There are no 
additional significant covariates in the diastolic model. When examining bivariate associations, there 
is no significance between CRN and systolic BP, but those who experience CRN are significantly 
more likely to have lower diastolic BP post values relative to their pre values (t=2.40; p<0.05).  
Lipids (Table 11): Results are only presented for total cholesterol and HDL, as LDL and 
triglycerides were not collected with enough frequency in both the pre and post periods. The 
cholesterol and HDL results should also be interpreted with caution, as there are only 20 and 21 
observations, respectively. In both models, there is no significant association between CRN and lipid 
values. In the HDL model, being nonwhite is associated with an 11.03 lower HDL value (SE=4.98) in 
the post period at the α=0.10 level. This is the only association that approaches significance. There 
are no significant bivariate associations between CRN and either total cholesterol or HDL.  
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Table 11: OLS regression results for Aim 2c: The effect of CRN on clinical outcomes 
 HbA1c Systolic BP Diastolic BP Cholesterol HDL 
 
CRN 
 
-0.54 
 
-7.37+ 
 
-4.45* 
 
-6.52 
 
0.61 
 (0.34) (4.03) (1.79) (25.34) (3.73) 
      
Has Medicaid -0.15 -5.54 -0.32 25.66 9.84 
 (0.53) (6.38) (2.83) (84.29) (12.40) 
      
Near poor -0.16 0.28 0.47 -23.63 -1.59 
 (0.33) (4.20) (1.86) (28.33) (4.17) 
      
Age -0.05 0.02 0.02 1.98 0.13 
 (0.03) (0.33) (0.15) (3.36) (0.49) 
      
Male -0.13 7.78* 0.04 3.82 -5.02 
 (0.32) (3.89) (1.73) (32.09) (4.65) 
      
Nonwhite -0.33 4.17 1.27 -37.43 -11.03+ 
 (0.34) (4.00) (1.77) (34.90) (4.98) 
      
Single -0.35 -3.09 -2.79 -15.35 -5.84 
 (0.33) (4.03) (1.79) (39.07) (5.71) 
      
Charlson index 0.16 2.82 1.22 -15.44 -0.72 
 (0.18) (2.37) (1.05) (18.49) (2.34) 
      
Family Med Clinic -0.28 -2.74 -0.85 -40.91 -2.64 
 (0.37) (4.21) (1.87) (32.38) (4.53) 
      
Log medication expense -0.05 1.01 0.65 9.96 2.26 
(Generic) (0.11) (1.18) (0.52) (15.03) (2.07) 
      
Constant 3.87+ -6.10 -0.92 -83.60 -2.49 
 (2.09) (25.52) (11.32) (237.54) (34.99) 
 
Observations 67 111 111 20 21 
R
2
 0.142 0.130 0.120 0.495 0.588 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Aim 2d: Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have higher health services utilization than those 
who did not experience CRN. 
Outpatient visits (Table 12): Holding all else constant, participants who experienced CRN 
had 2.28 (SE=0.84) more outpatient visits to a UNC clinic during the post period than those who did 
not experience CRN (p<0.01). A 1-unit increase in the Charlson index (being sicker) is associated 
(α=0.10) with 0.82 less outpatient visits in the post period relative to the number of visits in the pre 
period. The bivariate association shows a similar trend: those who experienced CRN had 1.0 more 
outpatient visits, while those without CRN had 0.95 less visits in the post period relative to the pre 
period (t=-2.45; p<0.05). 
Inpatient stays (Table 12): 33.3% of patients had a hospitalization at UNC during the course 
of the study period. In both bivariate and multivariate models, there is a significant association 
between CRN and inpatient visits. Holding all else constant, participants who experienced CRN had a 
259% increase in the odds of having an inpatient stay during the post period relative to beneficiaries 
who did not experience CRN (OR=3.59; p<0.05). The nonwhite and Charlson index covariates were 
also significant. Nonwhite participants had a 267% increase in the odds of having an inpatient stay 
(OR=3.67; p<0.05) and a 1-unit increase in comorbidity score was associated with a 703% increase in 
the odds of having an inpatient stay (OR=8.03; p<0.001). Having a previous inpatient stay was not 
predictive of having an inpatient stay in the post period.  
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Table 12: OLS and logistic regression results for Aim 2d: The effect of CRN on health services 
utilization 
 Outpt (Coeff) Inpt (OR) Inpt (Coeff) 
    
CRN 2.28** 3.59* 1.28* 
 (0.84) (2.13) (0.59) 
    
Has Medicaid 1.45 0.96 -0.04 
 (1.21) (0.89) (0.93) 
    
Near poor -0.40 0.94 -0.07 
 (0.93) (0.63) (0.68) 
    
Age 0.01 1.01 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
    
Male 1.33 1.94 0.66 
 (0.84) (1.19) (0.61) 
    
Nonwhite -0.63 3.67* 1.30* 
 (0.83) (2.32) (0.63) 
    
Single -0.15 2.11 0.75 
 (0.85) (1.28) (0.61) 
    
Charlson index -0.82+ 8.03*** 2.08*** 
 (0.48) (5.02) (0.62) 
    
Family Med Clinic -0.44 1.95 0.67 
 (0.87) (1.20) (0.62) 
    
Log medication expense 0.05   
(Generic) (0.22)   
    
Medication expense  0.84 -0.17 
(Generic)  (0.15) (0.18) 
    
Previous inpatient visit  0.65 -0.43 
  (0.57) (0.88) 
    
Constant -0.85 0.00+ -7.33+ 
 (5.55) (0.00) (4.14) 
 
Observations 164 163 163 
R
2
 0.091   
Pseudo R
2
  0.256 0.256 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Aim 3. 
To determine the association between total out-of-pocket costs and CRN, as well as between 
CRN and clinical outcomes and health services utilization. 
 
Aim 3 model specification: In all model specifications, the potential instruments failed. [Total out-
of-pocket costs] (both “as written” and “generic”) and [plan type] were tried as instruments, both with 
and without [benefit type detail]. In each case, the test for joint significance of these potential 
instruments was not significant. The χ2 test statistics were 2.76 (“as written”) and 3.60 (“generic”) 
when [benefit type detail] is not used. The χ2 test statistics were 2.75 (“as written”) and 4.56 
(“generic”) when [benefit type detail] was added as a potential instrument. None of these test 
statistics reached significance at the conventional α=0.05 level. The pseudo-R2 values for these four 
models ranged from 0.07 to 0.08. Again, these values are not considered high enough to proceed with 
a two-stage approach given my sample size. Therefore, [total out-of-pocket costs], [plan type], and 
[benefit type detail] do not have good predictive power to use as an instrument.  
The chosen approach is the same as in aim 2, where I estimated Eqs. 2 and 3 separately. Aims 
3b. and 3c. are explored by estimating the same models as described in aims 2b. and 2c. Again, small 
sample sizes limit the ability to detect an association between [CRN] and [outcome], and exploratory 
bivariate associations were estimated. 
 
Hypotheses: 
Aim 3a: Beneficiaries with lower total out-of-pocket costs will have a lower likelihood of 
experiencing CRN than those with higher total out-of-pocket costs.  
There are no bivariate or multivariate associations between total out-of-pocket costs and CRN 
for either “as written” or “generic” costs. In the “generic” and “as written” models, the Medicaid 
variable indicates that participants with Medicaid have 91% (“generic”)/ 92% (“as written”) lower 
odds of experiencing CRN relative to those without Medicaid (OR=0.09 (“generic”)/ 0.08 (“as 
written”); p<0.05) (Table 13). There are no other significant covariates in the model. 
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Table 13: Logistic regression results for Aim 3a: The effect of total out-of-pocket costs on CRN 
 “Generic” OR “Generic” Coeff “As written” OR “As written” Coeff 
     
Total OOP cost 1.02 0.02   
(Generic) (0.10) (0.10)   
     
Total OOP cost   1.10 0.10 
(As written)   (0.08) (0.07) 
     
Has Medicaid 0.09* -2.46* 0.08* -2.50* 
 (0.09) (1.08) (0.09) (1.08) 
     
Near poor 1.15 0.14 1.04 0.04 
 (0.47) (0.41) (0.42) (0.40) 
     
Age 0.95 -0.05 0.96 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
     
Male 1.10 0.09 1.02 0.02 
 (0.43) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) 
     
Nonwhite 1.23 0.21 1.28 0.25 
 (0.47) (0.38) (0.49) (0.38) 
     
Single 0.85 -0.16 0.89 -0.11 
 (0.34) (0.40) (0.36) (0.40) 
     
In Medicare Advantage 1.42 0.35 1.72 0.54 
 (0.54) (0.38) (0.66) (0.38) 
     
Charlson index 1.33 0.28 1.17 0.16 
 (0.31) (0.23) (0.26) (0.23) 
     
Family Med Clinic 1.15 0.14 1.02 0.02 
 (0.45) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) 
     
Constant 9.12 2.21 4.65 1.54 
 (25.07) (2.75) (12.78) (2.75) 
 
Observations 161 161 161 161 
Pseudo R
2
 0.106 0.106 0.114 0.114 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Aim 3b: Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have worse clinical outcomes related to their 
diabetes than those who did not experience CRN. 
See results in Aim (2c), above (Table 11). 
 
Aim 3c: Beneficiaries who experienced CRN will have higher health services utilization than those 
who did not experience CRN.  
See results in Aim (2d), above (Table 12). 
 
Aim 4. 
To determine the association between switching plans and differential costs, plan satisfaction, 
and CRN. 
 
Hypotheses: 
Aim 4a: Beneficiaries who switched plans will have lower differential costs (and will have a higher 
likelihood of being in a lowest-cost plan) than those who did not switch plans.  
Differential costs (Table 14): There is no bivariate association between plan switching and 
differential costs. OLS regression results also indicate that there is no significant association between 
previous plan switching and differential costs, for both the “generic” and “as written” models. These 
models are the same as those run in Aim (1c), with the addition of the key [previous plan switch] 
variable. None of the covariates changed significance from those models and the magnitudes also 
changed very little.  
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Table 14: OLS regression results for Aim 4a: The effect of previous switching on differential costs 
 “Generic” Coeff “As written” Coeff 
 
Switched plans 
 
0.02 
 
0.20 
 (0.22) (0.26) 
   
Has Medicaid -0.29 0.60+ 
 (0.28) (0.35) 
   
Near poor 0.40+ 0.70** 
 (0.20) (0.25) 
   
Age 0.02 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   
Male -0.21 -0.29 
 (0.18) (0.23) 
   
Nonwhite -0.16 -0.29 
 (0.18) (0.22) 
   
Single -0.26 0.19 
 (0.19) (0.23) 
   
In Medicare Advantage -0.32+ -0.72** 
 (0.19) (0.22) 
   
Charlson index 0.01 -0.08 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
   
Informed choice 0.22 0.25 
 (0.20) (0.24) 
   
Insurance agent -0.08 -0.27 
 (0.27) (0.32) 
   
Family Med Clinic 0.52** 0.17 
 (0.19) (0.24) 
   
Log med expense -0.00  
(Generic) (0.05)  
   
Log med expense  -0.07 
(As written)  (0.08) 
   
Constant -2.13+ -0.43 
 (1.22) (1.49) 
 
Observations 150 156 
R
2
 0.179 0.222 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Lowest-cost plan enrollment (Table 15): There is no bivariate association between plan 
switching and lowest-cost plan enrollment. Logistic regression results also indicate that there is no 
significant association between switching plans and lowest-cost plan enrollment, for “generic” or “as 
written” models. These models are the same as those run in Aim (1b), with the addition of the key 
[previous plan switch] variable. All covariates retained significance except for the [insurance agent 
helped chose plan] variable, which is not significant in this model. This includes the medication 
expense covariate in both models, with a 139% (“generic”)/ 76% (“as written”) increase in the odds 
of being in of a lowest-cost plan for a $1000 increase in medication expense (p<0.001). In the 
“generic” model only, a one-unit increase in the Charlson index comorbitiy score (being sicker) is 
associated with a 59% decrease in the odds of being in a lowest-cost plan (p<0.01) and being one year 
older is associated with a 10% decrease in the odds of being in a lowest-cost plan (p<0.05). In the “as 
written” model only, being near poor is associated with a 69% decrease in the odds of being in a 
lowest-cost plan (p<0.05).  
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Table 15: Logistic regression results for Aim 4a: The effect of previous switching on lowest-cost plan 
enrollment 
 “Generic” OR “Generic” Coeff “As written” OR “As written” Coeff 
     
Switched plans 0.93 -0.07 1.08 0.08 
 (0.49) (0.53) (0.53) (0.49) 
     
Has Medicaid 1.72 0.54 2.17 0.77 
 (1.42) (0.82) (1.61) (0.74) 
     
Near poor 0.67 -0.40 0.31* -1.16* 
 (0.37) (0.55) (0.16) (0.51) 
     
Age 0.90* -0.11* 1.00 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
Male 1.63 0.49 1.74 0.55 
 (0.82) (0.50) (0.79) (0.46) 
     
Nonwhite 2.08 0.73 1.14 0.13 
 (1.04) (0.50) (0.52) (0.46) 
     
Single 0.89 -0.12 0.59 -0.52 
 (0.45) (0.50) (0.27) (0.45) 
     
In Medicare 
Advantage 
1.21 0.19 1.29 0.25 
 (0.62) (0.51) (0.58) (0.45) 
     
Charlson index 0.41* -0.88* 1.00 0.00 
 (0.14) (0.34) (0.26) (0.26) 
     
Informed choice 0.66 -0.42 0.95 -0.05 
 (0.35) (0.54) (0.47) (0.50) 
     
Insurance agent 0.32 -1.15 1.34 0.29 
 (0.24) (0.77) (0.79) (0.59) 
     
Family Med Clinic 0.35+ -1.04+ 1.25 0.22 
 (0.21) (0.58) (0.57) (0.46) 
     
Medication expense  2.39*** 0.87***   
(Generic) (0.42) (0.17)   
     
Medication expense    1.76*** 0.57*** 
(As written)   (0.22) (0.13) 
     
Constant 167.22 5.12 0.05 -2.91 
 (603.58) (3.61) (0.16) (3.01) 
 
Observations 160 160 162 162 
Pseudo R
2
 0.306 0.306 0.195 0.195 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Aim 4b: Beneficiaries who switched plans will have a higher likelihood of being satisfied with their 
current plan than those who did not switch plans. 
There is a significant bivariate association indicating that those who previously switched are 
also more likely to report dissatisfaction with their current plan (χ2=4.99; p<0.05). There is also a 
significant multivariate association at the α=0.10 level between previous plan switching and current 
plan satisfaction, with no additional significant covariates in the model. Participants who previously 
switched plans have 111% higher odds of being dissatisfied with their current plan as compared to 
participants who did not previously switch plans (OR=2.11; p<0.10) (Table 16). 
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Table 16: Logistic regression results for Aim 4b: The effect of previous switching on plan satisfaction 
 OR 
  
Switched plans 2.11+ 
 (0.94) 
  
Has Medicaid 0.47 
 (0.34) 
  
Near poor 1.73 
 (0.79) 
  
Age 1.02 
 (0.04) 
  
Male 1.12 
 (0.48) 
  
Nonwhite 1.04 
 (0.44) 
  
Single 1.25 
 (0.54) 
  
In Medicare Advantage 0.81 
 (0.34) 
  
Charlson index 1.17 
 (0.29) 
  
Informed choice 0.50 
 (0.23) 
  
Insurance agent 0.76 
 (0.43) 
  
Family Med Clinic 1.90 
 (0.79) 
  
Medication expense 1.11 
(Generic) (0.12) 
  
Constant 0.03 
 (0.08) 
 
Observations 156 
Pseudo R
2
 0.076 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Aim 4c: Beneficiaries who switched plans will have a lower likelihood of experiencing CRN than 
those who did not switch plans. 
There is no bivariate association between plan switching and CRN. Logistic regression results 
also indicate that there is no significant association between previous plan switching and the odds of 
experiencing CRN. Having Medicaid is significantly associated with a 91% decrease in the odds of 
experiencing CRN relative to participants who do not have Medicaid (OR=0.09; p<0.05). There are 
no additional significant covariates in this model (Table 17). 
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Table 17: Logistic regression results for Aim 4c: The effect of previous switching on CRN 
 OR Coeff 
   
Switched plans 1.14 0.13 
 (0.51) (0.45) 
   
Has Medicaid 0.09
*
 -2.39
*
 
 (0.10) (1.10) 
   
Near poor 1.15 0.14 
 (0.47) (0.41) 
   
Age 0.97 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   
Male 0.87 -0.14 
 (0.35) (0.40) 
   
Nonwhite 1.15 0.14 
 (0.45) (0.39) 
   
Single 0.85 -0.16 
 (0.34) (0.40) 
   
In Medicare Advantage 1.37 0.32 
 (0.55) (0.40) 
   
Charlson index 1.18 0.17 
 (0.28) (0.24) 
   
Informed choice 1.03 0.03 
 (0.44) (0.42) 
   
Insurance agent 2.50 0.92 
 (1.32) (0.53) 
   
Family Med Clinic 1.06 0.05 
 (0.43) (0.40) 
   
Medication expense 1.08 0.08 
(Generic) (0.11) (0.10) 
   
Constant 3.23 1.17 
 (8.99) (2.78) 
 
Observations 159 159 
Pseudo R
2
 0.118 0.118 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
  
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
Implemented under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Medicare Part D provides a 
federal prescription drug benefit, administered in the private market, for all Medicare beneficiaries. 
Medicare Part D would work best if patients enrolled in the prescription drug plan that maximizes 
formulary coverage for their medications and minimizes annual out-of-pocket costs. Failure to enroll 
into a lowest-cost plan may increase the likelihood of cost-related non-adherence and, ultimately, 
negatively impact patient outcomes. My dissertation examined the prevalence and effect of being in a 
lowest-cost plan on critical patient outcomes: CRN; clinical parameters; and health services use 
among Part D beneficiaries with diabetes. To my knowledge, this is the first prospective cohort study 
to link patients‟ plan, CRN and clinical parameters and, as such, represents a contribution to the 
literature evaluating Medicare Part D. 
As in Medicare Part D, enrollees in this study are more likely to be female and minority 
relative to the general Medicare population.
9
 They are also representative of Medicare beneficiaries in 
general, as 92% of community-dwelling Medicare beneficiaries have at least one chronic condition,
125
 
and 42% of elderly adults take four or more medications, while 25% take seven or more.
35, 51
 This 
sample of people with diabetics takes an average of 9.2 medications, and over 50% rate their health as 
fair or poor. They are a fairly chronically-ill population, yet are well-controlled clinically.  
 
Differential costs are substantial (Aim 1)  
Aim 1 was a mostly descriptive study to examine the prevalence and predictors of being in a 
lowest-cost plan. Beneficiaries may be substantially overpaying to obtain their medications. I found 
that 75% of the sample was enrolled in a prescription drug plan that could result in out-of-pocket 
costs that are at least 10% higher than the lowest-cost plan for their prescribed medications. When I 
calculated the difference between their actual costs if they filled all of their medications and the cost 
of those same medications if they were in a lowest-cost plan, the mean differential cost was 
$1,215/year (assuming “as written” drugs) or $692/year (assuming generic substitutions). This is a 
particularly large sum of money in an elderly population, most of whom live on fixed incomes. Given 
that a large proportion of our sample are poor or near poor, they may have particular difficulty paying 
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for their medications, despite being enrolled in Medicare Part D. Price sensitivity can affect 
behavior—even small sums of money can delay seeking needed medical care. It is important to note 
that there may be reasons why some beneficiaries are choosing to enroll in plans that are not lowest-
cost plans, such as personal preference, more generous coverage, brand loyalty, or plan quality. 
Based on our results, focusing on differential costs may be more useful than whether or not a 
person is in a lowest-cost plan. There are several reasons for this. First, differential costs may better 
reflect the financial burden that affects CRN and, as a continuous variable, has substantially more 
variation. Second, the dichotomous outcome of being in a lowest-cost plan overlooks the possibility 
that there is a dollar threshold at which costs become prohibitive enough to impact CRN. For 
example, a person with differential costs of $6 on a $50 and another person with differential costs of 
$301 on a $3000 medication expense would both be classified as not being in a plan that is within 
10% of a lowest-cost plan. Third, the lowest-cost plan variable assumes that the distribution of plan 
choices and subsequent probability of enrolling into a lowest-cost plan is identical for all medication 
expenses. To the extent that this is not true, it introduces omitted variable bias. Given these reasons, 
the remainder of the discussion, including policy implications, will focus on differential costs.  
 
Differential costs are higher for poorer beneficiaries 
The relationship between Medicaid status and differential costs varies between “generic” and 
“as written” models. In “as written” models, having Medicaid is associated with higher differential 
costs, whereas in “generic” models, having Medicaid is associated with lower differential costs. This 
may occur because dual eligibles have access to generous subsidies in the benchmark plans to which 
they are assigned. However, in most of these plans, coverage of generics is generous and less so of 
brand-name drugs. Brand coverage is much more restrictive, so “as written” cost estimates may be 
capturing off-formulary medications that are driving costs significantly higher than those of their non-
dual counterparts. Therefore, it is likely that the “generic” cost estimates are a more realistic, 
conservative assumption of what is happening in the real-world for the majority of dually-eligible 
beneficiaries. Provided that they do not have expensive brand-name medications that their formulary 
does not cover or that they prefer brand rather than generic (i.e. refuse generic substitution), their 
costs are generally adequately subsidized. However, there are likely still a minority of duals for whom 
their formulary does not adequately meet their medication needs, and their costs do fall into this 
situation. Despite an exemptions process to deal with getting off-formulary medications covered, 
clinicians who deal with this population anecdotally report that this process is rarely used to 
completion with success.  
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Those near poor also have higher differential costs (“generic” & “as written”). Unlike the 
dually-eligible, these beneficiaries were not randomly assigned to plans (and so were not guaranteed 
as least a basic level of continuity of coverage or baseline level of access). However, like the duals, 
they are also relatively poor and vulnerable to the consequences of such poverty. That is, they may be 
more susceptible to the perils of a complex enrollment process such that they may have even fewer 
resources than the average Medicare beneficiary with which to navigate the enrollment process and 
system. Indeed, these results indicate that the near poor have significantly higher differential costs 
relative to the higher income category of participants, which could indicate that they had greater 
trouble navigating the enrollment process than their higher income counterparts.  
 
Factors that predict CRN (Aim 2) 
Three factors were found to be associated with increased CRN. First, as hypothesized, 
participants with higher differential costs report greater CRN for the “as written,” but not “generic,” 
models. This may occur for multiple reasons. It is possible that “as written” differential costs make 
the overall magnitude of total out-of-pocket costs higher, thus making beneficiaries more susceptible 
to CRN. It is possible that this relationship actually exists for “as written” and “generic”, but the “as 
written” models allow greater sensitivity in small samples due to larger cost estimates and wider 
range.  
Second, in multiple models (aims 2b&3a), having Medicaid is associated with a decreased 
reported CRN. This may indicate that dually-eligible beneficiaries are effectively shielded from some 
of the prohibitive costs that put them at risk for CRN. While costs to the beneficiary are heavily 
subsidized by CMS, this largely depends upon the beneficiary‟s medication being on-formulary, 
which varies by plan. Among qualifying plans, formulary coverage is generally generous for generics 
and commonly-prescribed medications; however, off-formulary medications are less likely to be 
covered.  
Third, having an agent makes individuals more likely to experience CRN. This finding is 
interesting because agents‟ financial incentives may not be aligned with those of beneficiaries, 
thereby reducing the chance of being enrolled in a lowest-cost plan. The association with CRN 
suggests that there may be adverse consequences of having agents drive plan choices.  
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Relationship between CRN and outcomes (Aims 2, 3) 
There are an array of factors that may interfere with optimal adherence, including: adequate 
follow-up, patient perception of treatment benefits, provider-patient relationships, and comorbidities. 
As such, the ability to detect a relationship between adherence and clinical outcomes may be 
limited.
87, 126
 These results were less able to establish a firm link between CRN and clinical outcomes 
(HbA1c; BP; lipids). In part, this may be a function of the relatively small sample, especially for 
lipids. However, this may also be a function of the study participants having relatively good control 
of these parameters, despite poor self-rated health status. Notably, patients in both clinical venues 
were recruited from diabetes registries that are used by clinicians to help manage patients‟ health. 
Whatever the reason, the good control for these clinical parameters decreases variation in these key 
outcomes and, as such, decreases our ability to find a statistically significant relationship. 
In contrast to the clinical parameters, self-reported health status was significantly associated 
with CRN in the hypothesized direction, that is, those with higher medication expenses were less 
likely to report being in good health. It is possible that individuals who report being in poorer health 
are more likely to skip medications due to cost, rather than that the CRN itself is driving their health 
status. Either way, this finding further suggests the importance of addressing the barriers that prevent 
these individuals from obtaining the medications necessary to maintain their health. 
As hypothesized, CRN is associated with both higher inpatient and outpatient utilization in 
the post period. This suggests that individuals who are having trouble paying for medications are also 
sicker. Indeed, as comorbidities increase, the odds of having an inpatient stays increase by 700%. 
However, sicker patients have almost 0.8 fewer outpatient visits, which may indicate that they are 
experiencing barriers to utilizing all health services and may wind up in an inpatient setting.  
 
Plan switching (Aim 4) 
Having previously switched plans is not predictive of differential costs, lowest-cost plan 
enrollment, or CRN. However, those who had previously switched plans were more likely to be 
dissatisfied with their current plan. In focus groups and surveys, beneficiaries generally indicate that 
they are satisfied with their current plan.
25, 51, 57
 However, beneficiaries also report problems with their 
plans, despite this satisfaction. These issues may include higher-than-anticipated expense, needing to 
switch medications due to formulary, or having difficulty obtaining medications.
57
 It is possible that 
this general satisfaction stems from being previously uninsured, or just being unaware that there may 
be better plan options out there for them. This may indicate that beneficiaries are unaware of less 
expensive PDP alternatives. Our results suggest people who had a particular reason for switching 
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plans in the past (i.e costs were too high; they did not like a plan feature or benefit design) may be 
particularly aware of such similar features in their new plan, and therefore may be more likely to 
voice dissatisfaction. In contrast, beneficiaries who are unaware of such undesirable plan features 
may be less likely to report dissatisfaction. 
 
Study limitations 
There are several limitations to consider in the design of this study. First, the sample size was 
relatively small. Despite attempting to contact all eligible patients in both the family medicine and 
internal medicine clinics, I only had 165 participants who both completed surveys and returned their 
HIPAA authorization forms. Based on discussions with clinic directors, we expected to enroll 
between 300 and 400 patients. In our post-hoc power calculations, there is insufficient statistical 
power to detect a significant effect of a dichotomous key independent variable on a dichotomous 
outcome variable (aims 2b. & 3b.; 2c. & 3c.—inpatient only; 4b.; 4c.). A sample size of 489 would be 
required to detect an odds ratio of 1.9. Therefore, where appropriate, all clinical outcome variables in 
aims (2b) and (3b). (HbA1c, BP, lipids) are used continuously in Aims (2b) and (3b). Therefore, 
bivariate associations are used as a means of exploratory analysis to detect a potential relationship 
between CRN and clinical outcomes, with no significant findings.  
A related limitation involves the recruitment protocol. We used strategies that were respectful 
of clinic flow and patient time. Our lower-than-expected sample size may result from several factors. 
First, 264 people could not be contacted after 6 repeated attempts and one phone message. A majority 
of these individuals had disconnected phone numbers and/or never answered the phone at all. 
Practitioners indicate that many of these individuals intentionally give an incorrect phone number to 
UNC so as to not be contacted. Next, we contacted 285 individuals who were ineligible, most 
frequently because they did not have Medicare Part D. This percentage may have been high because 
the area directly surrounding UNC and the patient populations at the Internal Medicine and Family 
Medicine practices may have a high proportion of retired state employees with the state employees 
health plan, who opted out of Part D. Although 66 participants who completed surveys did not return 
HIPAA forms, they were similar to the participants who did return the forms.  
There were potential limitations related to operational definitions of several key measures. 
First, CRN was measured with a widely-used 3-item scale that is dichotomized (adherent or not). In 
an attempt to increase variation, I scored participants‟ responses to each question as a 3-point scale 
and summed across items. This produced a score that ranged from 0 to 5, but the distribution was 
highly skewed and had little variability. For these reason, I retained the dichotomous variable because 
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it is consistent with what has been reported in the literature.
86
 Using a dichotomous variable decreases 
variation, so results may have been biased towards null results in Aim 2. Second, income was 
approximated with a three-level categorical variable: dual (<100% FPL, in addition to asset criteria); 
near poor (100-250% FPL); and >250% FPL. While we assessed the low-income subsidy using a 
survey question, telephone interviewers reported that study participants had a difficult time 
understanding this question. Therefore, it was not used as a covariate in regression analyses. To 
estimate socioeconomic status, we used WebCIS to identify patients who are eligible for charity care. 
I count anyone who received charity care in WebCIS (even if it was recently expired) as "near poor." 
Although individuals may fall in and out of eligibility for this subsidy, it is still a reasonable marker 
of patients who are socioeconomically vulnerable. Third, data on prescribed medications, clinical 
parameters, and health care utilization come from WebCIS. Although we will have complete data for 
these outcomes at UNC, we do not know the extent to which patients may have medications 
prescribed or utilization outside UNC. We attempted to minimize any potential bias by enrolling only 
patients who receive primary care from either the family medicine or general internal medicine clinic 
at UNC.  
Fourth, estimates of our cost variables using the PDPF assumes that patients fill all 
medications as prescribed. To allow flexibility, we considered costs of both filling medications as 
prescribed (“as written”) or allowing generic substitutions. There may also be measurement error in 
the medication costs variables because these were calculated using the medication list from one point 
in time (the survey date). Previous research has shown that actual medication use is likely to change 
over time, with the potential for lowest-cost plan to change with it.
50
 While the medication list as of 
the survey date may not be the same medication list that the beneficiary used from which to choose a 
plan, these lists will become more similar the closer the date becomes to December 31
st
, or the date at 
which the beneficiary assessed plan choice (usually during open enrollment). 
Given the way in which costs were estimated, we are not able to differentiate between the 
components that comprise annual out-of-pocket medication expense. That is, we obtained cost 
estimates in lowest-cost and actual plans, but do not know the benefit structure of these plans to 
determine which portion of these costs are deductibles, premiums, or copays. This is a limitation 
because it introduces heterogeneity into the measure, such that participant decision-making that may 
be based on these marginal cost components is not captured. We are unaware if a participant 
purposefully chose a plan to minimize premiums while willing to pay slightly higher copays; the 
lowest-cost plan measure assumes that they just minimized total out-of-pocket costs, without regard 
for the differentiation between premiums and copays. Our general measure of CRN assumes that it is 
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the overall cost, not any one component part, that leads to CRN. This may be an erroneous 
assumption. 
Finally, this study sample may have limited generalizability because it was drawn from 
patients receiving care at one academic medical center. Moreover, their names came from a diabetes 
registry that is used to increase access to a diabetes disease management program. This may explain 
why their clinical parameters are under excellent control despite patients reporting being in poor 
health. In addition, they may have access to more enrollment resources than the general Medicare 
population when considering programs available in the area, such as those in the School of Pharmacy; 
in community pharmacies; through local student and community volunteer organizations. Notably, 
despite these resources, a majority of participants were not in lowest-cost plans, resulting in their 
having substantially higher out-of-pocket medication costs than necessary.  
 
Policy implications 
MedPac considers several performance indicators when monitoring “the ability of the 
program—under its competitive approach—to meet the Medicare goals of maintaining beneficiary 
access while holding down program spending.”9 One of these indicators is beneficiaries‟ access to 
prescription drugs, and another is the quality of services. Arguably, this research addresses both the 
access and quality issues by examining the differential costs that are being incurred by beneficiaries 
to obtain their medications, and whether such excess payments lead to CRN, worse clinical outcomes, 
or increased health services use. 
 
Implications for Policy and Research 
This research informs several policy options to improve Medicare Part D. First, it is 
important to consider ways to increase the proportion of beneficiaries in lowest-cost plans and/or to 
decrease differential costs. What might explain the strikingly high proportion of individuals who are 
not in the lowest-cost plan? Certainly, the complexity of the enrollment process into Medicare Part D 
and random assignment of patients who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid can contribute 
to our observation. Several factors may contribute to the low proportion of beneficiaries in lowest-
cost plans, including: too much complex information for them to effectively use; infrequent use of the 
PDPF tool; insufficient access to help resources; lack of plan switching; and the use of agents in plan 
enrollment.  
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Above a certain threshold, it is unnecessary for elderly beneficiaries—most of whom live on 
modest fixed incomes—to overpay for medications that are necessary to manage their chronic 
conditions and maintain their health. While there may be an acceptable limit at which some 
beneficiaries choose to pay extra for more generous coverage, the differential costs amounts in the 
hundreds to thousands of dollars that we found in this research are arguably out of this range and can 
be addressed through policy interventions.  
There are several policy options that CMS should consider. First, it could expand education 
or outreach efforts to increase the ability of beneficiaries to identify their lowest-cost plan given their 
prescribed medications. Certainly, that was the intent of the online PDPF tool. However, data from 
our study and others suggests that even among patients enrolled in primary care, this tool is not 
widely-used or accessible by this population.
41, 42
 Such technical tools are unlikely to be effective 
because they offer too much information for beneficiaries to digest, and when they become 
overwhelmed, they choose not to use the tool at all. Alternatively, they are simply unable to access 
the internet themselves and/or are unaware of the tool‟s existence.  
Second, CMS could develop less technical tools to direct patients into lowest-cost plans. 
However, simple educational interventions are not likely to work. Non-web-based strategies will be 
less scalable to large segments of the population. And, interventions that require health care personnel 
(e.g., physicians, nurses, pharmacists) may be impractical and expensive unless specific incentives are 
provided.  
Third, enrollment processes and/or plan choices could be simplified. While this would be a 
shift away from the fundamental premise upon which Medicare Part D was built, it may make sense 
when considering the chronically-ill, elderly population which the benefit is intended to serve. A 
recent survey indicated that 66% of people favored decreasing the number of plan options and 84% of 
people favored obtaining coverage directly from Medicare.
52
 There were few significant demographic 
characteristics to predict which types of people support these two policy options, 
52
 which may 
indicate that the support is widespread.  
Fourth, CMS could provide financial incentives to patients for enrolling in lowest-cost plans. 
For example, they could provide a rebate or discount to patients who, at the annual enrollment, use 
the PDPF to make their decisions. Given the relationship between CRN and utilization, such a 
strategy may well pay short- and long-term dividends to CMS. Alternatively, given differences 
between “as written” and “generic” cost estimates, CMS could provide incentives to patients and/or 
providers to implement generic substitution unless clinically contraindicated. Substituting generic for 
brand-name medications will reduce differential costs and has the potential to also reduce CRN. 
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There is very little cost (both time and monetary) to implementing such policies in clinical practice, 
and at UNC and elsewhere, this practice is already widespread. Many Part D plans have already 
successfully steered beneficiaries from brand-name drugs to their generic equivalents since the 
benefit began.
9
 However, it is not clear that the shift towards generic use is due to the implementation 
of Part D itself. Rather, one study showed that there was already a time trend towards more generics 
use, both among Part D and non-Part D enrollees, and the growth rate of generic use was lower 
among Part D enrollees, with results varying by drug class.
127
 In either case, the results of this 
research suggest that the increased use of generics relative to brand-name drugs can have a beneficial 
impact on patient outcomes and the practice should both continue and be expanded. 
It is also important to consider whether beneficiary-centered assignment may be a more 
efficient policy with which to enroll duals. Costs are effectively minimized for duals, if they were 
randomly-assigned/chose/switched into to a plan with a formulary that sufficiently covers their 
medications. This may be happening for some duals, but not others, with much of this depending 
upon the combination of plan assignment and formulary coverage (given that costs are standardized). 
In this sense, Medicaid may be protective against CRN for the majority of duals who end up among 
the subset of benchmark plans with generous formulary coverage of generics. Beneficiary-centered 
assignment would take into account whether it can do a better job of matching beneficiaries with a 
plan that most closely fits their medication needs, or whether the costs (financial, time) associated 
with it are worth the investment, given the relatively standardized costs and formularies among 
benchmark plans.  
Lastly, CMS should consider the structure of Part D in the context of health care reform. 
Under health reform, insurance is partly provided through Health Benefit Exchanges. The structure of 
these Exchanges bears similarities to the way in which Part D is delivered: the federal government 
contracts with private insurers; there are minimum standards that plans must meet; and competition 
and choice are hallmarks of the program. These similarities are such that the complexities associated 
with Part D enrollment have the potential to extend into the new insurance marketplace.  
Some of the limitations of this study could be addressed in future research. This could include 
replicating these findings with a larger dataset that follows participants over a longer study period. 
CMS Part D data could be used to examine out-of-pocket spending and a different set of outcomes, 
linked to Parts A & B data. Individual plans would not be identifiable, and claims data would be used 
rather that medical record data. This would offer additional strengths in terms of having actual 
prescription fill data, but would lose the ability to detect clinical parameters as outcomes.  
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Alternatively, the results of this study could inform future research that explores the reasons 
why individuals are not in lowest-cost plans; such research could include qualitative methods to 
further explore enrollment decisions and processes. A comparative study could also prospectively 
follow individuals who have received enrollment assistance (i.e. SeniorPharmassist) versus those who 
have not (such as participants in this study) and track their outcomes for longer periods of time. 
 
Conclusion 
This research represents a contribution to the literature by being among the first studies to 
examine enrollment decisions, costs, CRN, and clinical parameters in an elderly Part D cohort. It also 
confirms the findings of several other recent studies reporting that only a minority of beneficiaries are 
enrolled in lowest-cost plans.
37, 38, 56
 The results of this study should be of interest to clinicians and 
policymakers. It is important to understand the impact of health policies on the beneficiaries that they 
are intended to serve, particularly in the case of elderly beneficiaries who are vulnerable to the 
consequences of a benefit that can be complicated to navigate. This research has demonstrated that 
policy implementation can impact patient costs and outcomes, and this lesson will be important to 
carry forward in the context of health reform. 
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APPENDIX A: Telephone survey 
 
Hi, my name is __________ and I am calling from UNC to request your help with a research 
study that we are conducting. You should have received a letter from UNC within the last 2 weeks. 
The letter included a $5 gift card. Do you remember receiving this letter? As you probably know, 
Medicare Part D began to cover prescription drugs in 2006. I am trying to learn about Part D by 
talking to up to 400 Medicare beneficiaries about the prescription drug benefit, and I could use your 
help to learn more.  
If you are willing to help me, I would like to ask you a few questions over the phone that 
should take no longer than 5 minutes, and I may call again only if I need you to clarify an answer. 
There are no costs to participate. Your participation is completely voluntary and your answers will be 
kept confidential. You can skip or refuse to answer any of the questions that I ask you and can stop 
taking the survey at any time. The only foreseeable risk might be if your identity were revealed, but I 
will not record your name with your responses, so this cannot happen. Although your participation 
will not benefit you personally, you will help us to gain important knowledge about Medicare Part D. 
Are you willing to participate by answering this short survey? 
 
 
 
1. Do you have Medicare Part D to help you pay for your 
medications? 
 
 
___ Yes 
___ No 
___ Refused 
___ Don‟t know 
 
 
 
2. How satisfied are you with your current Medicare 
prescription drug plan? 
 
 
___ Very satisfied 
___ Somewhat satisfied 
___ Neutral 
___ Somewhat dissatisfied 
___ Very dissatisfied 
___ Don‟t know 
 
 
 
3. In the past year, have you ever switched Medicare Part D 
plans? 
 
 
  b. (If yes), in which month did you switch plans? 
 
 
c. (If yes), what was the reason that you switched? 
 
 
 
___ Yes 
___ No 
___ Refused 
___ Don‟t know 
 
 
 
4. When you first enrolled into Medicare Part D, how did you 
choose a plan? 
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5. Did you have help choosing a plan (for example, from an 
agent, physician, pharmacist, family member, friend, or other 
caregiver?) 
   
 
b. (If yes), from whom did you receive help? 
 
 
 
 
___ Yes 
___ No 
___ Refused 
___ Don‟t know 
 
 
6. Do you receive extra help paying for your medications 
through the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan? This means that 
you receive help paying for some or all of your monthly 
premium, and, in some cases, help paying for other medication 
costs. This was also referred to as the Low-Income Subsidy 
Program offered through Medicare and the Social Security 
Administration. 
 
 
___ Yes 
___ No 
___ Refused 
___ Don‟t know 
 
 
Now I would like to ask you a few questions about your 
medications. 
 
7. During this year (current year), were any medications 
prescribed for you that you did not get because you thought it 
would cost too much? Please include refills of earlier 
prescriptions as well as prescriptions that were written or 
phoned in by a doctor.  
 
 
 
 
___ Yes 
___ No 
___ Refused 
___ Don‟t know 
 
8. Please tell me how often during this year (current year) you 
have done any of the following things, responding “often, 
sometimes, or never” 
  
   a. Taken smaller doses of a medicine to make the  medicine 
last longer? 
  
 
 
   b. Skipped doses to make the medicine last longer? 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Asked for generics instead of brand name drugs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___ Often 
___ Sometimes 
___ Never 
___ Refused 
___ Don‟t know 
 
___ Often 
___ Sometimes 
___ Never 
___ Refused 
___ Don‟t know 
 
___ Often 
___ Sometimes 
___ Never 
___ Refused 
___ Don‟t know 
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9. In general, would you say your health is: 
 
 
___ Excellent 
___ Very Good 
___ Good 
___ Fair 
___ Poor 
 
 
 
10. In general, do you usually get vaccines and immunizations 
such as the flu shot or pneumonia vaccine? 
 
 
___ Yes 
___ No 
___ Refused 
___ Don‟t know  
 
  
 
11. What is the name of your Medicare Part D plan? 
 
[Which company provides your insurance? If you are unsure, I can 
help you to figure this out by looking at your Medicare card while we 
are on the phone together…] 
 
 
  
 
 
Thank you so much for your time. Another part of this project involves getting information 
from your medical record about your health and medications. This information would help us 
understand how Medicare Part D might best help beneficiaries such as you. Any information about 
you will be kept confidential and will not be identifiable. Would it be okay with you if I had access to 
your medical record? 
(Y) 
Ok, thank you. In order for me to be allowed to look at your medical chart, I will need you to 
sign a permission form. I mailed this permission form in with the letter that I sent you last week. Do 
you recall getting this form? It is 2 pages long and 2 copies of it were mailed to you. 
Can you please sign one of the copies of this form and mail it back to me in the envelope that 
was included? There is already a stamp on it so all that you will need to do it sign it and put it in the 
mail. 
Thanks again for your time. I really appreciate your help today. If you have any further 
questions, you can contact me at 919-966-6446. 
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APPENDIX B: General Internal Medicine recruitment letter 
 
 
INTERNAL MEDICINE CLINIC 
 
 
You are getting this letter because you have received care in the Internal Medicine Clinic at the 
Ambulatory Care Center at UNC-Chapel Hill. Currently, we are conducting a research study entitled 
“Plan enrollment and costs for Medicare Part D beneficiaries,” to better understand Medicare‟s 
prescription drug benefit (“Medicare Part D”). To do this, we are requesting your help. We need to 
ask people like you about your experiences with the Medicare drug benefit. What we learn in the 
study could eventually help to improve the program. 
 
In the coming weeks, you will be receiving a phone call to ask you about your experiences with 
Medicare Part D. If you do not wish to receive a phone call, you may call 1-800-243-0887 to alert us 
that you do not want to be contacted. 
 
If you choose to participate in this study, we will ask you about your experiences with Part D during a 
phone conversation that should last no more than 5 minutes. Choosing not to participate in this study 
will not affect the care that you receive at UNC.  
 
We have included a $5 gift card with this letter as a small token of our appreciation for helping with 
this study. You may keep this gift card whether or not you choose to participate in the study.  
 
The attached form, titled “HIPAA Authorization for Use and Disclosure of Health Information for 
Research Purposes,” grants permission for us to access your health care record. If you are willing to 
be in the study, you should sign one copy of this form and keep the other copy for your records. You 
can use the enclosed, stamped envelope to send this form back to the researchers at UNC. Once you 
send us this form, we will be able to access your health care record only to get study information. In 
our study, none of this information will be connected to your name. 
 
If you have any additional questions, you can contact Kristin Geonnotti at 919-966-6446. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
 
Sincerely, 
Thomas M. Miller, MD 
Director, Internal Medicine Clinic 
 
 
 
Internal Medicine Clinic at the Ambulatory Care Center 
Mason Farm Rd. & S. Columbia St., CB # 7705, Chapel Hill, NC 27514 
Telephone 919-966-1459 ● Fax 919-843-9355
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APPENDIX C: Family Medicine Center recruitment letter 
 
 
 
You are getting this letter because you have received care in the Family Medicine Center at UNC-
Chapel Hill. Currently, we are conducting a research study entitled “Plan enrollment and costs for 
Medicare Part D beneficiaries,” to better understand Medicare‟s prescription drug benefit (“Medicare 
Part D”). To do this, we are requesting your help. We need to ask people like you about your 
experiences with the Medicare drug benefit. What we learn in the study could eventually help to 
improve the program. 
 
In the coming weeks, you will be receiving a phone call to ask you about your experiences with 
Medicare Part D. If you do not wish to receive a phone call, you may call 1-800-243-0887 to alert us 
that you do not want to be contacted. 
 
If you choose to participate in this study, we will ask you about your experiences with Part D during a 
phone conversation that should last no more than 5 minutes. Choosing not to participate in this study 
will not affect the care that you receive at UNC.  
 
We have included a $5 gift card with this letter as a small token of our appreciation for helping with 
this study. You may keep this gift card whether or not you choose to participate in the study.  
 
The attached form, titled “HIPAA Authorization for Use and Disclosure of Health Information for 
Research Purposes,” grants permission for us to access your health care record. If you are willing to 
be in the study, you should sign one copy of this form and keep the other copy for your records. You 
can use the enclosed, stamped envelope to send this form back to the researchers at UNC. Once you 
send us this form, we will be able to access your health care record only to get study information. In 
our study, none of this information will be connected to your name. 
 
If you have any additional questions, you can contact Kristin Geonnotti at 919-966-6446. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
 
Sincerely,  
 
Samuel Weir, MD 
Director,  
Family Medicine Center 
 
 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Family Medicine Center, William B. Aycock Family Medicine Building, 
CB# 7586 Manning Drive, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-7586 • Telephone: (919) 966-0210 • Fax: (919) 966-6126 
www.fammed.unc.edu/fpc/fpc.htm 
 
Samuel Weir, MD 
FMC Director 
Sam_Weir@med.unc.edu 
 
Susan Slatkoff, MD 
FMC Associate Director 
Susan_Slatkoff@med.unc.edu 
 
Thomas Koonce, MD 
FMC Associate Director 
Thomas_Koonce@med.unc.edu 
 
Susan Baize 
Practice Manager 
Phone: (919) 966-1596 
sbaize@unch.unc.edu 
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APPENDIX D: Enclosure to facilitate Part D plan identification 
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APPENDIX E: HIPAA consent form 
 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
HIPAA Authorization for Use and Disclosure of Health Information for Research Purposes 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IRB Study # 08-1156 
 
Title of Study: Plan enrollment and costs for Medicare Part D beneficiaries 
 
Principal Investigator: Kristin Geonnotti 
Mailing Address for UNC-Chapel Hill Department:  
Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
725 Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd. 
CB# 7590 
Chapel Hill, NC 27599 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
This is a permission called a “HIPAA authorization.” It is required by the “Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996” (known as “HIPAA”) in order for us to get information 
from your medical records or health insurance records to use in this research study.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. If you sign this HIPAA authorization form, you are giving your permission for the following 
people or groups to give the researchers certain information (described in #2 below) about you: 
Any health care providers or health care professionals that have provided health services or 
treatment for you such as physicians, clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, diagnostics centers, laboratories, 
treatment or surgical centers, including the UNC Health Care System. 
 
2. If you sign this HIPAA authorization form, this is the health information about you that the people 
or groups listed in #1 may give to the researchers to use in this research study:  
Information about your medical visits; lab values; prescription drug plan; and your treatment 
(including conditions and medications prescribed for you) 
 
3. The HIPAA protections that apply to your medical records will not apply to your information when 
it is in the research study records. Your information in the research study records may also be shared 
with, used by or seen by the sponsor of the research study, the sponsor‟s representatives, officials of 
the IRB, and certain employees of the university or government agencies if needed to oversee the 
research study. HIPAA rules do not usually apply to those persons. There are multiple ways that the 
researchers will protect your confidentiality. The study dataset will not contain any individual 
identifiers, meaning that your information will not be linked to your name in any way. All data will 
be protected using password protection and locked files. The data will be destroyed when the study is 
over. You can ask the researchers any questions about what they will do with your personal 
information and how they will protect your personal information in this research study.  
 
4. If this research study creates medical information about you that will go into your medical record, 
you may not be able to see the research study information in your medical record until the entire 
research study is over. 
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5. If you want to participate in this research study, you must sign this HIPAA authorization form to 
allow the people or groups listed in #1on this form to give access to the information about you that is 
listed in #2 on this form. If you do not want to sign this HIPAA authorization form, you cannot 
participate in this research study. However, not signing the authorization form will not change your 
right to treatment, payment, enrollment or eligibility for medical services outside of this research 
study.  
 
6. This HIPAA authorization will stop when the study is over. 
 
7. You have the right to stop this HIPAA authorization at any time. HIPAA rules are that if you want 
to stop this HIPAA authorization, you must do that in writing. You may give your written stop of this 
HIPAA authorization directly to Principal Investigator or researcher or you may mail it to the 
department mailing address listed at the top of this form, or you may give it to one of the researchers 
in this study and tell the researcher to send it to any person or group the researcher has given a copy 
of this HIPAA authorization. Stopping this HIPAA authorization will not stop information sharing 
that has already happened.  
 
8. You will be given a copy of this signed HIPAA authorization. 
 
 
___________________________________   _________ 
Signature of Research Subject    Date 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
Print Name of Research Subject 
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APPENDIX F: Decision rules for entering medications into the PDPF tool 
 
1. PRN medications: All medications prescribed on an “as needed” basis will be entered as 1 
fill/year. This includes nitroglycerin, which technically should be filled 2/year (medication 
should be refilled every 6 months due to expiration), but for consistency all PRN meds will 
be entered this way. This will lead to more conservative cost estimates. 
 
2. Insulin: Always choose the basic insulin option, unless WebCIS prescription specifically 
states that something else is prescribed (pen, mix, etc) 
- Humalog pens come as 5 x 3ml pens/box 
- Lantus: 10 mL vials; 3 mL cartridge system—package of 5; 3 mL SoloStar—package 
of 5 
 
3. Inhalers: Albuterol inhalers are not available generically, and thus only albuterol sulfate tabs 
and nebulizer are in PDPF. Proventil HFA is entered instead when albuterol sulfate inhaler is 
prescribed. 
- Often times inhalers are prescribed PRN, but not always. For those prescribed PRN, 
follow decision rule #1 and enter as 1 fill per year. For those written to be refilled 
more often, enter into PDPF as prescribed. Clinicians may prescribe them both ways 
depending upon condition and desired use. 
- Nebulizers are covered by Part B, unless the person does not have Part B and only 
has Part D (this is very rare). Therefore, exclude nebulizers from being put into the 
PDPF because Part B will cover them for everyone in this sample. 
- 90 mcg = 1 puff. 200 inhalations/canister (Albuterol) 
 
4. Standard inhaler doses: 
- Combivent: 2 inhalations x 4 times a day. 14.7g inhaler = 200 puffs 
- Flovent: 440 mcg x twice/day. 120 puffs/1 box 
- Atrovent: 200 puff/inhaler 
- Advair: choose the 60/pack option. This corresponds with standard dose (1 inhalation 
x twice/day) 
- Spiriva: each capsule = 18 mcg; standard dose = 1 capsule once daily; 3 cartons 
available (5 capsules; 30 capsules; 90 capsules) 
 
5. Eye drops: Always chose the 10 ml bottle option (1/month), as this one is most-commonly 
used. (Further information not specified in WebCIS). 
 
6. Oxygen: Covered by Part B, so exclude from PDPF. 
 
7. Phenergan: When phenergan is prescribed, enter “promethazine” into PDPF. This is the 
generic name and usually what is dispensed when the tablet form is needed. 
 
8. Proscar: Enter Proscar as Finasteride. Proscar went off patent in 2009 and is not an available 
option in the PDPF. Again, this errs on the side of a more conservative cost estimate. 
 
9. Potassium Chloride: This is covered by Part D (under the category 
“electrolyte/replenisher”). In PDPF, scroll down to choose the right dosage. 
 
10. Antibiotics: Exclude short-term antibiotics. But there are some instances in which an 
antibiotic may be prescribed long-term. Determine based on Qty RXD and Refills and put 
into PDPF accordingly. 
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